Arab Independence And Unity

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Accn. No . Cle-3s

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UONFiDENTIAI NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

ARAB INDEPENDENCE
AND UNITY.

A NOTE

)N THE ARAB CAUSE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PALESTINE
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A PERMANENT SEHLEMENT
TO WHICH ARE ATTACHED TEXTS OF ALL
THE RELEVANT DOCUMENTS.

BY

General Nuri as-Sa’id.

BAGHDAD

FEINTED AT THE GOVEBNMENT PEESS,
1943.

CONTENTS.

Pags.

1. Letter from General Nuri Pasha as-Sa’id, k.c.v.0., c.m.^ g.d.s.o.,
to the Rt. Hon. R. G. Casey n.s.o., m.c

2. Note on Arab Independence and Unity with particular reference

to Palestine and suggestions for a final settlement

3. Palestine Documents :

(a) Correspondence between the Sherif Hussein of Mecca and
Sir Henry MacMahon, July 14, 1915 to March 10th, 1916 . .

13

(5) Extracts from the Anglo-Pranco-Russian Agreement April

May 1916 (generally known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement). 26

((3l) General Maude’s Proclamation to the people of Baghdad
1917

(d) The Balfour Declaration November 1917

(e) Communication from the British Government to the
of Hejaz February 8, 1918

(/) British Government Declaration of June 16, 1918 (commonly
known as ''The Declaration to the Seven")

(g) Anglo French Declaration Nov. 7, 1918

(h) Text of the Anglo Iraq Treaty of June 1930

(i) British Government Statement of Policy on Palestine, 1930,

(commonly known as 1930 White Paper)

(j) Text of Speech by General Nuri as-, Said at the Palestine
Conference London 13-2-1939

39

31

32

34

36

37

43

50

{k) Statement of Policy of the British Government in respect

of Palestine 1939 (commonly known as 1939 White Paper), go

(Z) Faisal- Weizmann Agreement . . 79

(m) Resolutions of the General Syrian Congress held at

Damascus July 2nd, 1919 , , 73

(n) Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission with

regard to Syria — ^Palestine and Iraq . . 75

My Dbab Mb. Casey,

our conversation about the future of the Arabe States
I decided to follow your advice and write a memorandum on the
subject show^ my personal interpretation of the problems facing
us and putting forward my suggestions for their solution. The
attached note has been prepared by me in my personal capacity, and
although I Imow that several of my colleagues and other Iraqi leaders
have similar views I do not wish it to be regarded in any way as a
statement of the Iraq Grovernment’s policy.

As you are very busy these days and cannot be expected to read
up the details of pledges and promises made twenty four years ago,
and all the discussions that have taken place since, I have tried to
give as briefly as possible a summary of what has happened since the
end of the last War. While my reading of the past differences
between the Arabs and the British and the French is perhaps not
unnaturally coloured, I have for the purpose of this note treated the
subject as olyjeetively as I can.

In view of the recent activities of Zionist organisations in
England and America I feel that some declaration should be made
by Great Britain and the United States of America regarding the
future of the Arab territories which formerly formed part of the
Ottoman Empire. The Palestine Post on November 2nd 1942 gave
prominence to a report of a public demonstration held in London on
November 1st under the auspices of the Zionist Federation. Messages
of sympathy were sent by a number of prominent persons who are
entitled to their own views, but we were surprised that two serving
Secretaries of State, sent messages of sympathy. The Zionist
Federation has always declared that by a National Home in Palestine
they mean an independent Jewish State and sympathy with Zionism
implies support of their policy of creating such a State in Palestine,
although the British Government has freqently and categorically
declared that that is not her policy.

In Iraq we are not allowing news of this kind to be published,
as we do not want Arab feeling to be inflamed against the Jews and
the British. But, if the Zionists and their sympathisers are allowed
to continue their propaganda, it will be ve:i^ difiScult for Arab
leaders to restrain Arab journalists and poKticians from initiating
counter propaganda in the Arab States. Unfortunately, in England
and America friends of the Arab cause have always experienced great
difficulty in securing publicity for their views and now in war time the
position is worse owing to the shortage of newspaper space. Moreover
the terrible persecution which the Jews are suffering in Germany,
Italy and occupied Europe naturally evokes sympathy for Jevre
generally, and anybody who writes or speaks against Zionism is in
danger of being regarded as condoning these persecutions.

Some time ago there was an agitation by the Zionists to create
a Jewish Army in Palestine and elsewhere to fight against the A-rin
The British Government refused to be persuaded. But t.n1riTig
advantage of the recent disclosures of Jewish massacres in Poland
and Germany, the Zionists are again pressing for a Jewish Army and
have succeeded in enlisting very strong support for it in the
United States.

ii

A Jewish Army unconnected with Palestine is no concern of
the Arabs in Palestine or of the Arab States. But will the Zionists
be content with a Jewish Army divorced from the Jewish National
Home or Zion (Palestine) ? If there is any intention of recruiting
such an Army in Palestine or using it in Palestine or neighbouring
Arab countries, the Arabs are bound to consider that the intention
is to force the Allied Nations to accept the Zionist demand for a
Jewish State and that this army’s ultimate purpose will be to fight
the Arabs for the possession of Palestine. As you know some Jews
are boasting that already in Palestine they have the nucleus of an
Army with stores of rifles, machine guns and grenades. I am
inclined to disbelieve this, but if such claims continue to be made
they wiU cause further alarm to the Arabs there.

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader, in an article in Foreign
Affairs, an American quarterly, for January 1942, again urges the
creation of a Jewish Seate in Palestine and writes as if it is bound to
be established after this War. Prom 1919 to 1922 he expressed the
same views, then, when he realised the strength of Arab opposition
to these claims he modified them. Now he has revived them. I
feel that if the United Nations made a definite pronuncement now^ to
the effect that they will not support the creation of a Jewish State
in Palestine but adhere to the policy laid down in the White Paper
of 1939 the Zionists would make protests of course, but would accept
the decision as final. They believe that it is possible in the course
of a great struggle such as the present War to exact promises which
would not be made in time of peace. So their extreme claims should
be- refused categorically now. At the same time, if you agree with
my suggestion, it would be possible for the United Nations to
guarantee the future of the Jewish National Home as it exists at
present in Palestine with all the possibilities of its normal semi-
autonomous development within the fabric of a greater Syria and an
Arab League.

I invite your consideration of these matters as I am of opinion
that, unless both the Zionists and their British and American
sympathisers cease their propaganda during the war, the Arabs will
start their own propaganda and that the Axis Powers will seize the
opportunity, so presented, to create bad blood between Great Britain
and the Arabs of the Near and Middle East.

Your Sincerely
(Sd.) NURI as-SATD.

The Rt. Hon. R. G. CASEY, as.o., m.c.,

Minister of State,

Cairo.

Dote on /Irab Independence and Unity

With

PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO PALESTINE AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT.

The Arab peoples can be divided into two main groups, (1) those
living in Africa and (2) those living in Syria, in Palestine, in Iraq
and in the Arabian peninsula.

Although in the second group the Arabs of the Arabian
peninsula can be generally distinguished from those of Syria, Iraq,
Palestine and Trans-Jordan yet linguistically, culturally, economically
the Arabs of those former Ottoman provinces are one people. In
spite of the fact that during the past twenty years they have been
divided into several different States and that diverse laws have been
introduced into these States, yet, owing to the improvement in
communications and education, they are culturally as close together
as they have been for centuries. (This sameness particularly applies
to the Ottoman territories lying on the South Eastern coast of the
Mediterranean. Syria, formed one compact Arab area of which
Palestine, the Lebanon and Trans- Jordan were parts not distinguish-
able from each other nor from the present truncated State of Syria) .
These regions including Iraq were all part of the territories of the
Ottoman Empire ; no international boundaries divided them, the form
of administration was the same, and the same law applied. The
habits and customs of the inhabitants in these areas were the same
whether they were Muslim or Christian as ind^d were their food and
their general outlook.

Although in Syria and Palestine considerable numbers of
Christians are to be found they are mainly Arab in origin and their
customs, their language, their way of life are much the same as those
of their Muslim neighbours. In the past the Christian denominations
have frequently been more hostile towards each other than towards
the Muslims who treated all denominations alike.

The only Christian community which had a special position was
that of the Maronites. In 1846 following disturbances between the
Maronites and the Druzes of the Lebanon, this province was “placed
under a privileged regime based on a large measure of autonomy
which allowed the Maronities to have their own system of local
government under a Christian Governor.” This special form of
administration rested on an International Guarantee.

. - I ' ' Sfi ‘ 1 r -

As under the old Ottoman Empire there existed various
“Millets” with special rights, the idea of semi-autonomous communi-
ties vnthin the State is familiar to all Arabs of the Succession States
and generally accepted as a fair and sensible policy. This privileged
regime of the Maronites deserves careful study as it can be the model
for semi autonomous Jewish provinces in Palestine, as will be
explained later.

2

These Arabs of the Near and the Middle East, have for nearly
a century, been struggling to secure their natural right to indepen-
dence so that they may be able to unite; to recreate their ancient
glory, and to progress in the path of civilization in freedom and
peace. But, so far, political factors, external rather than iutemal,
have obstructed their way and stood between them and their
legitimate goal.

Wlien the Arabs lost their independence several centuries ago,
some of their countries fell to the Ottoman Empire and other were
later seized by European countries and treated as colonies. Yet all
this did not destroy the idea of independence in he Arab mind.
Although Arab aspirations were suppressed for many years the desire
for independence eventually revived, stronger and mightier than ever.

In the Ottoman Empire Arabs, as Muslims, were regarded as
partners of the Turks. They shared with the Turks both rights and
responsibilities without any racial distinction :■ the higher appoint-
ments in the State, whether military or civil, were open to the Arabs;
they were represented in both the upper and the lower houses of the
Ottoman Parliament. Many Arabs became Prime Ministers, Shaikhs
al Islam, Generals and Walls, and Arabs were always to be found in
all ranks of the State services.

When the decline of the Ottoman Empire began and the Party
of Union and Progress started the Pan-Turkish Movement, the Arabs
preferred to separate from that Empire; they launched a campaign
for the defence of their rights, thereby pamng the way for the
independence of their countries.

At the beginning of the first Great War in 1914 the Arabs
realised that a gloomy future awaited them owing to the «iTiis t.p!r
behaviour of the Party of Union and Progress which had thrown
itself into the arms of the Germans and joined them in the war
against the Allies. So King Hussein bin ‘Ali (who was then the
Sherif and Prince of Mecca) approached Great Britain who definitely
pledged herself to secure for the Arabs their indepenance. Belying
on those promises. King Hussein proclaimed in 1916 the separation
of the Arabs from the Ottoman Empire and joined the Alliftg TTho
were then passing through the most critical and dangerous stage of
the War. The Arabs in sdl their countries welcomed the step taken by
^g Hussein and supported him in the hope that they would find
in the pledge of the AUies the realization of their national aspira-
tions. In consequence Arabs in Turkish territory were subjected to
indescribable persecution and atrocities. But they fought the Turks
on jhe side of the Allies and shared in the conquest of Palatine
and Syria.

In spite of the doubts raised in their minds when the Turks
made public the terms of the secret Sykes-PSkot Agremnent and when
the BaMour Declaration was published, the Arabs continued to triat
m the repeated pledges given by Great Britain to King Hussein, and
to the Arabs of Syria and Iraq generally in various Ptoelamations,
mat ‘■‘the future government of these territories should be based
the principle of the consent of the governed.” This confidauce

3

beeame a certainty in Arab minds when in his famous Pourteai Points
Presideat Wilson laid down that: — ^“The Turkish portic^ of the
present Ottoman Empire should be secured a sure sovereignty, but
the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be
assu3red an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested
opportunity of autonomous development.”

But the Arabs were gravely disappointed after the war which
ended with victory for the Allies with whom they had joined and
with whom they had fought relying on their pledges to secure Arab
independence. At the Peace Conference the Arabs realized that their
victorious Allies had gone back on their promises. In fact the treat-
ment which the Arabs received from their Allies was worse than that
accorded to the vanquished who were not placed under any form of
tutelage. The Allies divided the Arab territory amongst themsdv«i
according to secret treaties, granting themselves Mandates over these
regions, in spite of the strong protests of all Arab leadera These
Mandates were harder for the Arabs to bear then the old Ottoman
rule. The Mandatory System broke up the Arab territories into
a number of separate administrations and was an arrangement which,
if persisted in, would destroy Arab unity for ever. Iraq was placed
under Great Britan as was Southern Syria, and Northern Syria was
handed over to Prance. Only the Arab States of the Arabian
peninsula were allowed complete independence.

During the last twenty years the Arabs have tried in every way
to attract the attention of the civilized world to the wrong that has
been done to them; they have constantly endeavoured to persuade
world opinion of the justice of their cause and have struggled
incessantly to obtain their independence. This mandatory system
adopted by their Allies of the last Great War was obnoxious to the
freedom loving Arabs who resent any form of tutelage. It has been
the cause of all the disturbances, rebellions, boycotts and ill-will
which have existed in these Arab countries and which still threaten
their peace.

IRAQ

Iraq had been a mandated territory till 1932, when, by the
exertions of her own people and aided by the British Government
she obtained her independence and was admitted to the League of
Nations in the same year. Ever since her independence, Iraq has
been chiefly interested in her own affairs, following the path of
development and advancement which can be seen in aU the Adds
of her activities. She is bound to Great Britmn by the Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty of AUiauce of 1930 under the terms of which both States
cooperate with complete understanding to their mutual benefit.

Iraq is not merely a neighbour of other Arab countries, die is
elosdy connected to them by the strongest linguistic, racial^ rdigiou^
cultural, economical and other ties. In addition, Iraq, shares with
her neighbouring Arab countries tiie ideal of Arab Unity which it
ist hoped will be ultimately realised. Without such Uuimi the
Arabs will never be able to have their proper place in the wrarld
r^ain thier past glory of which they are so rightly proud,

4

• Iraqis believe that such an Arab Union can only be effected by
securing true independence for all Arab countries which, in the
course of time, will make their choice as to the nature of the union
which suits them best and fully guarantees their interests. These
considerations have made Iraqis always responsive to happenings in
the neighbouring sister Arab Countries and take an intense interest
in them. 'Whatever happens in Syria or Palestine has some reper-
cussion in Iraq. Although for centuries the Jews enjoyed complete
liberty in Iraq and lived on excellent terms with their Muslim
neighbours yet violent anti-Jewish feeling has been aroused by the
events in Palestine. This hostility has been fanned by German
Radio propaganda. As a result in 1941 when an interregnum existed
in Iraq and the forcse of law and order were out of hand, the mrb
looted the peaceful non-Zionist Jews of Baghdad and murdered a
number of them. For this reason responsible statesmen in the Arab
States, where large Jewish communities are residing, are always
apprehensive of the effect in their own countries of what happens in
Palestine. This also applies to all that occurs in the non-independent
Arab regions.

NORTHERN STRIA; {The present mandated territories of Syria
and the Lebanon).

This was the most advanced of all the Arab provinces. The
Syrians were the first to begin the Arab National movement for
independence. American and French Universities and schools have
been propagating learning and ideas of freedom among Arabs in
Syria for over eighty years. In consequence Syria not only has a
very numerous highly educated and cultured class of lawyers, doctors
and Arts graduates but has a population with a highly developed
political spirit.

In spite of the fact that Syria and the Lebanon are not less
civilized than many Buro-pean countries, the unsound mandatory
system which has been imposed upon them has impoverished them
and created dissension among their peoples, leading to frequent
disturbances and disorder. The Syrian Arabs have seized every
opportunity to win true independence and even sacrificed their desire
for unity in order to obtain it. They made agreements with the
French for their country to be divided into two States— the Lebanon
and 'Syria. Unfortunately, they have been informed by a recent
official announcement that, after about twenty five years of waiting
for freedom, their countri^ are still to remain part of the French
Empire. At the time of this declaration the French were lying under
the yoke of Nazism and their governments, both central and colonial
were supporting the Nazis whole-heartedly. The Arabs cannot
believe that this decision wiU be upheld by the United Nations

SOUTHERN SYRIA:— divided into two mandated ternfories
as Palestine and Transjorda/n.

The rival^ of Great Britain and France has separated these two

""" territories, from sS of

vhich they form an integral part. Transjordan ^joys a form S

5

autonoDiy tinder the rule of Prince Abdullah, Son of King

Hussein, but is as anxious to obtain full independence as any of the
other Arab Countries,

Of all the various problems facing the Arab countries that of
Palestine is the most difficult and calls for most serious attention,
because the policy hitherto followed has resulted in obvious injustice
to its origin^ inhabitants, the Arabs, who still constitute two thirds
of the population. The Arabs of Palestine want to live independent
in their own country; but the Zionist policy aims at wresting the
land from the hands of its legitimate owners in order to transform
it into a Jewish State. The Arabs do not hate the Jews, but the>3’^
abhor the Zionist policy which aims at the annexation of their
country. The Zionist Movement is backed by unlimited fimds,
powerful institutions and political parties, as well as by distinguished
personalities of great influence in Great Britain and America, while
the Arabs of Palestine can only rely on the justice of their cause
and their own exertions. Although the Arabs of Palestine have
the moral support of Arabs in all neighbouring countries these
countries, have been powerless to help them, materially or militarily,
owing to their alliances, in force or contemplated, with Great Britain
or Prance. Moreover the Arab States want a peaceful settlement
by agreement not by force.

The Arabs from the very beginning believed that the pledges
that Great Britain gave to the late King Hussein (both when he was
Sherif of Mecca and later when he was King of the Hejaz) included
Palestine, Trans-Jordan and most of Syria. The declaration stated :

^‘That subject to certain modifications (which excluded
Mersin, Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the
West of Damascus, Homs, Hama and AUepo) Great Britain
is prepared to recognise and uphold the independence of the
Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed
by the Sherif of Mecca.''

The British Government has never seriously challenged the
Arab contention that Palestine was included in this pledge conveyed
through Sir Henry MacMahon in 1915. (The full text of the
correspondence is attached to this note).

The Balfour Declaration was made subsequent to this deftuite
pledge and when its contents alarmed the Arabs, the British Govern-
ment sent a special envoy, Commander Hogarth, to set the doubts of
King Hussein at rest. King Hussein was assured that ‘‘Jewish settle-
ment in Palestine would only be allowed in so far as would be
consistent with the political and economic freedom of the Arab
population."

While the terms of the Palestine Mandate give special rights to
the Jewish Agency and Jewish settlers in Palestine, it nowhere lays
down that the Jews are to have a Jewish State in Palestine. (The
Arabs, of course, have never accepted the Mandate as legal or binding
on them and in the Mandate they are not even mentioned by name).
In successive Statements of Policy, published as White Papers,
H.M.G. has in 1922, 1930 and 1939, declared that “it is not part of
British policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State."

6

Wien Great Britain accepted the mandate for Palestine her
first concern was to facilitate the creation of a Jewish National Home
by assisting the Jewish Agency and other Jews to purchase land and
by arranging the peaceful transfer of the Arab cultivators of
such land. She also endeavoured to secure Arab goodwill for
the Jewish National Home. The Mandatory was also occupied in
establishing efScient administration and essential public services.
So, for many years she made no serious effort to carry out the
duty imposed upon her of assisting the inhabitants of Palestine to
advance towards self-government. Unfortunately, when she even-
tually did consider how best to execute this part of her task, Arab
fears of ultunate Jewish dominance and hostilily to the Mandate had
become so intense that it was impossible to secure their cooperation
in any proposed legislative or other assembly which might have paved
the ■vn.y for self-government.

In 1937 Mr. Ormsby Gore then Secretary of State for the
Colonies told the Permanent Mandate Commission in. the clearest
possible terms “that in the absence of a radical change in the political
relations it would not be possible to carry on ( — ^the government of
Palestine) except by methods of continuous military repression. The
fact was that in Palestine the vast majority of the population was
hostile to the Mandatory Power and to the Mandate. The loyalty
of the Arabs was not directed toward Great Britain, the Mandatory
Power, but to the Arab race and the Arab ideal.” At this meeting
the Secretary of State reiterated this view “The Mandatory told
the Mandates Commission — as it would tell the Council later— that
they were convinced of the necessity of political changes”, and again
“It was his definite opinion that once the Arabs of Palestine (fired
as they were with political hostility both to the Mandatory Power and
to the Jews) were given self-government it would be to their interest
to maiatain security

As a result H.M.G. recommended the partition of Palestine
mto three States— a Jewish State, an Arab State and a British
Mandated area.

Upon careful examination by a /^eeial Boundary Commission
me partition of Palestine into separate States was found to be
impracticable. But this Commission did not examine the possibility
of creatmg a Jemsh enclave or enclaves, with special rights on the
h^mite model, inside a Palestinian State or a greater Arab State
which would imlude Syria and Trans-Jordan. The creation of two
n? “ff®, .completely independent States out of the smaU territories

involved the creation of complex artificial
boundaries with numerous pockets of Jews in the Arab State md
~ it wotJd We meant the oreation ot S one“teS
honaloomto and pomUy mote. But if aU Pateti^we faSSi
in one Sytiw State the boundaries of the Jettish enclnves wnnla ho
adminWatiVe beundatiea tmly. The JewiiS^ rf

a number of qadhas or even nahivais in t ® consist ot

ap«U tiehtoi alternatively, by^ artanStt

autoiomSS^SiSstrSn^^Si AraSSti^SL*''^?^*

to ae^p. to bye under the apeifjSr^

7

Howevw, the partition of Palestine into tm» independent States
and a Mandated area, which had pleased nobody, was declar^
impossible and the final policy of Great Britain was made public in
1939 after the Palestine Conference bad broken down.

In the latest White Paper of 1939 H.M.G. declared that;

“(l)The objective of His Majesty’s Government is the
establishment within ten years of an independent
Palestine State in treaty relations with Great
Britain

(2) The independent State should be one in which Arabs
and Jews share in government in such a way as to
ensure that the essential interests of each community
are safeguarded.”

The White Paper of 1939, in effect, limited the Jewish National
Home in Palestine to the Jewish communities then resident in
Palestine plus. 75,000 Jews who were to be allowed to settle in
Palestine during the five years 1939 — 44. This meant that the Jews
in Palestine would in 1944 constitute about a third of the population
and that they would remain a permanent minority. H.M.G. therefore
considered that by 1944 her pledge in the Balfour Declaration would
have been fulfilled and a Jewish National Home established in
Palestine. All that remained was to establish self-government in
Palestine in such a way as would best safeguard the rights of the
Jews who had settled in Palestine under the terms of the Balfour
Declaration. The detailed proposals put forward by H.M.G. to reach
this objective do not affect the underlying basis of the Statement
of Policy: — That Palestine had to be given self-government as soon
as possible and that the Jews should be a permanent minority in
this new State.

The Conference which met in London for the consideration of
the Palestine question in 1939 was the first occasion on which the
Arab States were recognised by H.M.G. as being mutually interested
in the settlement of the Palestine problem. The Conference included
delegates representing Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Taman, Tran- Jordan
and Iraq who were invited because their States were interested in
the future of Palestine, it being an Arab territory, and its administra-
tion and future development a matter of common concern to all Arabs.
In Arabs eyes this invitation marked a return by Great Britain
to the spirit of her old pledges to King Hussein which regarded all
Arabs in the old Ottoman Empire as one community united by one
ideal. This, is my first justification for raising these issues and
making my suggestions at this time.

It has to be admitted that conditions in all these Arabs countries
have remained unsettled ever since the end of the last Great War.
Numerous rebellions have broken out causing much bloodshed and
devastation in many parts of these Arab lands. Apart from this,
the most law-abiding inhabitants of these countries have always been
the viqtima of worry and anxiety about their own future and that of
their compatriots during all these long years. In Palestine and

8

Syria even the non-rebellions Arabs feel that they have not been
allowed to develope their full civil and political rights. They have
had no confidence in the ability of the Mandatory regime to provide
a permanent peaceful form of government. They have had to live
in territory too often subject to disorder to enable them to consider
the future and prepare for it.

As soon as the present war broke out the axis povrers did not
lose a moment in looking for weak points in the Allied position in
the Arab countries and promptl3'- exploited any weaknesses they were
able to discover. Elements of disorder and anarchy in all Arab
countries were actively and unscimpulously supported with the result
that both the Arabs and the United Nations suffered severely

In spite of previous disillusionments the Arabs have welcomed
the Atlantic Charter with satisfaction because they consider it a
guarantee for the realization of their national aspirations and for
their future union in the way they choose of their own free will.
We feel that the British Government regards the Arab claims
with sympathy and that she is ready to solve the problems of the
Arab countries in the same satisfactory manner as she solved those
of Iraq. If she succeeds in putting these s3Tnpathetic intentions into
effect the present chaotic state of the Arab countries will come to an
end to the benefit of the Arabs themselves. We realize that the
British Government has not a free hand in dealing with these
problems, because her action is subject to the concurrence of her
Allies. But now that the U.S.A. are co-operating so fully with Great
Britain the hands of the latter are freer and we feel that it will be
possible for her to reconsider her whole policy towards all Arabs.

All Arabs and particularly those of the Near and Middle East
have deep down in their hearts the feeling that they are “members
one of another.” Their | nationalism’ springs from the Muslim
feehng of brotherhood enjoined on them by the Prophet Muhammad
m his last public speech. It differs therefore from a great deal of
European nationalism and patriotism. Although Arabs are naturally
attached^ to their native land their nationalism is not confined by
boundaries. It is an aspiration to restore the great tolerant emlsa-
tion of the early Caliphate.

therefore believe that any policy which satisfies the legitimate
political nghiB and aspirations of the Arabs will restore peace to the
Arab countneSj and that such peace and contentment will be of
invaluable service m promoting the interests of the United Nations
period of wai*. Moreover, such a poKcy will put an
^d to the Axis mtri^es in the Arab countries and stop the flood
of Am propaganda which finds there a most fertile soil for sowing

Situation and their anxiety about their future.

verv'SiXItSo? *T+ T&vM the weakness of

P e ful to protect all the members from aggression. While I realise

9

that many years must elapse before the Arab States can stand
completely alone, yet, even their allies among the Great Powers will
probably demand that they make a greater contribution to their own
defence services. Therefore the old idea of creating an independent
Palestine and an independent Lebanon and Syria must be abandoned
and a new solution considered.

Great Britain and France have repeatedly declared that they
agree to the future independence of each of these parts of historical
Syria. If independence is admitted to be the right of the people
living in these areas they must ipso facto have the right to coalesce
in a unitary State or join together in a league or confederation. If
experience has proved that very small States cannot adequately
defend themselves and that they constitute a danger to their neigh-
bours and to the peace of the world, then union or federation can
justly be imposed on them if these separate States really form one
community, linguistically, culturally and economically.

Paragraph Pour of Artcile 22 of the Covenant of the League of
Nations reads as follows: —

^‘Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish
Empire have reached a stage of development when their existence as
independent Nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the
rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory
until such time as they are able to start alone. .

Doubts have been expressed at various times as to whether
Palestine came within the ambit of this paragraph. But Mr.
Malcolm MacDonald told the Mandates Commission of the League of
Nations in 1939 that '‘the Arabs of Palestine could not be regarded
as so utterly different from the Arabs of Iraq or Syria that rights
which clearly belonged to the latter under paragraph four should be
completely denied to their fellow Arabs in Palestine.'^

This statement goes to the root of the whole problem. The
Arab contention is that all the Muslims, Christians, Jews and Druzes
who occupy the Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan and Palestine are one
community not differing very greatly from the inhabitants of Iraq.
In 1918 this community was better educated than the Iraqis and more
acquainted with and tolerant of modern, centralised, bureaucratic
administration.

The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations
decided in June 1939 that the proposal of H.M.G. to set up in Pales-
tine an Arab State in which the Jews would form a minority was
contrary to the interpretation which had always been placed upon the
Palestine Mandate. In commenting on this decision H.M.G. pointed
out that it had been found impracticable to form both an independent
Arab State and an independent Jewish State in Palestine but that
" one of the possibilities which the Mandatory Powers had in view is
the establishment of a federal constitution.'’

. 1 - Now Palestine is a very small territory with a population of less
than 2 million souls. To create a federal constitution for such a small
country would be difiSeult and expensive. But if Palestine reverts

10

to its proper place as part of the historical Syria it should be possible
to create for Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan either a
unitary State or a federal constitution which would work efficiently.
If the Palestinian Arabs could be reunited with the Arabs of
Syria and Trans- Jordan they would not be so apprehei^ive of Jewish
expansion and the Jewish eommnnities now in Palestine would feel
safer and more settled. They could be allowed a considerable degree
of local autonomy under some form of international guarantee if
that is considered necessary.

Lx the very protracted and frank discussions which took place
between Mr. Malcolm MacDonald and the Permanent Mandates
Commission in June 1939 the point was raised again and again that
there must be a spirit of evolution in the consideration of specific
pledges and promises. While ia no way denying the validity of the
various pledges and promises given by H-M.©. to various communi-
ties, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald felt that these pledges and promises
had to be reinterpreted from time to time in the light of the develop-
ment both political and economic that had occurred in Palestine since
the pledges were first given. Such reconsideration is indeed
speeifically provided for in Article 19 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations which lays down that; “The Assembly may from time
to time advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of
treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of
international conditions whose eontinnanee might endanger the peace
of the world.” This is another justification for recommending the
re-examination of the whole position of the Arab States of the Near
and Middle Bast.

In Iraq whose population in 1918 was more backward politically
and educationally than that of Syria and Palestine it has been shown
that an independent nature state can function efficiently with the
minimum of advice and support from ite Ally- In Saudi-Arabia
H.M. Ibn Saud has shown that an Arab Ruler can maintain peace
and order over nomad Bedouins occupying vast stretches of
desert and over settled Arabs in towns and oases and consider-
ably develope their resources. The discovery of oil in Arab
countries has given then economic resources and revenues not hitherto
available. Iraq needs an outlet to the Mediterranean for its oil and
other products. Palestine which is being rapidly industrialised
needs markets for its products and oil fuel for its factories.
These are facts which have to be taken into account and which
justify a re-examination of the pledges given by the British Govern-
ment Mme of which were embodied in the Mandates of the League
of Nations. These present factors call for a new policy altogether
which will settle permanently the future of the inhabitants of the
Near and Middle Bast.

My proposals which follow are based on the close relations which
already exist between Iraq and all the Arabs of historic Syria. The
States of the Arabian peninsula although so near to us in language,
custom and religion have a different economy. Bgypt has a larger
population than the Succession States and has her own problems in
the Sudan and elsewhere. I have therefene assumed that these States

net at first be inclined to join an Arab Federation or League,
though if such a union succeeded between Iraq and Syria there

ll

is every likelihood that they would iu time wish to Join it.
But from the very beginning I anticipate that such a League,
even if limited to Iraq and Syria, would facilitate joint consultation
between and action by all Arab States whether within the League or
not. Many of our problems are the same ; we are all part of one
civilisation; we generally think along the same lines and we are all
animated by the same ideals of freedom of conscience, liberty of
speech, equality before the law and the basic brotherhood of mankind.

CONCLUSION:

In my view the only fair solution, and indeed the only hope of
securing permanent peace, contentment and progress in these Arab
areas is for the United Nations to declare n&wi —

(1) That Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan shall be
reunited into one State.

(2) That the form of government of this State, whether monar-
chical or republican whether unitary or federal, shall be
decided by the peoples of this State themselves.

(3) That there shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq
and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by
the other Arab States at will.

(4) That this Arab League shall have a permanent Council
nominated by the member States, and presided over by one
of the rulers of the States who shall be chosen in a manner
acceptable to the States concerned.

(5) The Arab League Council shall be responsible for the
following: —

(а) Defence.

(б) Foreign Affairs.

(c) Currency.

(d) Communications.

(e) Customs.

(/) Protection of Minority rights.

(6) The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They
shall have the right to their own rural and urban district
administration including schools, health institutes, and
police subject to general supervision by the Syrian State.

(7) Jerusalem shall be a city to which members of all religions
shall have free access for pilgrimage and worship. A
special commission composed of representatives of the three
theocratic religions shall be set up to ensure this.

(8) That if they demand it, the Maronites in the Lebanon shall
be granted a privileged r%ime such as they possessed
during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. This special
r%ime like those to be set up in paragraphss 6 and 7 above
shall rest on an International Guarantee.

la

If it is possible in the manner suggested above to create a Con-
federation of Arab States including Iraq, Syria, Palestine and
Trans-Jordan at the beginning, to which other Arab States may later
adhere, then a great many of the difSloulties which have faced Great
Britain and Prance in the Near East during the past two decades will
disappear. The Arabs of Palestine at present fear that they will
become a minority in a Jewish State, and therefore bitterly oppose
the grant of special rights to the Jews, but this hostility would be
allayed if Palestine became part of a large strong Arab State. The
Jews could establish their National Home in those partis of P’alestine,
where they are now the majority with a greater feeling of security,
because there would be more goodwill on the part of their Arab
neighbours, and as a semi-autonomous community in a much larger
State their economic opportunities would increase.

The British Empire is not founded on negations but on positive
ideals. Free institutions and free co-operation give it a living force
of tremendous strength. Upon this foundation of free co-operation
a true union of many diverse peoples and countries has been formed,
depending less upon stipulations and statistics and more upon the
nobler and more permanent principles which are written on the heart
and conscience of man. If an opportunity is given to the Arab
peoples to establish such a free cooperation among themselves they
will be prepared to deal generously with all the Jews living in their
midst whether in Palestine or elsewhere. Conditions and guarantees
there must be, but let them not constitute a dead hand lest they
become a dead letter, as so many minority provisions in European
constitutions became during the past twenty years.

If my proposals meet with favour they will require careful
examination, so that the appropriate steps are taken at the right time
and in the right order. Obviously, the union of the various parts of
historic Syria must come first. It may at first take the form of a
federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, each state
continning its own local administration, leaving defence, foreign
relations, currency and customs to the Central Government. On the
other hand it may be foimd possible to unite Syria at once, making
provision for the Jewish enclaves and the Jerusalem regime
at the same time. Steps should be taken at once to define these
enclaves and for this purpose it would be necessary to prepare an
accurate ethnographical map of Palestine showing the number of
Arabs and Jews in each Nahya and town, also, a map on the same
scale showing the land under cultivation and the land which can be
cultivated intensely in the future. An inquiry should also be made
as to the number of Jews who have settled in Palestine since the
outbreak of the war in September, 1939.

To s^ure Arab union sacrifices of sovereignty and vested inter-
^ts may have to be made. Similar sacrifices have been made in the
British Dominions and can be equally demanded from Arab leaders.

/I 1 ^ ttooughout assumed that as France before the war
was prepared to grant independence to Syria and
V ® tlie United N^ions to

nhf “r federation of Arab States by

msistuig on old pmileges or antiquated rights.

13

Appendix (A)

THE McMAHON CORRESPONDENCE.

(Covering Letter To No. 1)

The Amir ‘Abdullah to Mr. Ronald Storrs.

Mecca, Bamadan 2, 1333.

(July 14, 1915).

Complimentary Titles,

I send my affectionate regard and respects to your esteemed
self, and trust that you will ensure, as you know how to, the accept-
ance of the enclosed note which contains our proposals and conditions.

In this connexion, I wish to give you and your Government my
assurance that you need have no anxiety about the intentions of our
people, for they realise how closely their interests are bound to those
of your Government. Do not' trouble to send aeroplanes or warships
to distribute news and reports as in the past our minds are now
made up.

"What^ we would request is that you should maike it possible for
the Egyptian Government to resume the consignment of the bounty
of grain for the poor of Mecca and Madina, which was stopped last
year. The arrival of this year’s grain, together with last year’s,
would be valuable here for the promotion of our mutual interests. To
a person of your quick understanding, this hint will suffice.

I beg of you not to send us any commimieations until you hear
that our plans hpe matured, except for the reply to this letter and
its enclosure, which should only be sent through the bearer. Perhaps
you win think fit to give him a written warrant to enable him to pass
through to you whenever we think it necessary to send him. He is
dependable.

Compliments.

No. 1

The Sharif Husain’s First Note To Sir Henry McMahon.

Mecca, Eamadan, 2, 1333.

(July 14, 1915).

Complimentary Titles.

Whereas the entire Arab nation without exception is determined
to assert its rights to live, gain its freedom and administer its own
affairs in name and in fact ;

And whereas the Arabs believe it to be in Great Britain’s inter-
est to lend them assistance and support in the fulfilment of their
steadfast and legitimate aims to the exclusion of aU other aims-

14

And wiereas it is similarly to the advantage of the Arabs, in
view of their geographical position and their economic interests, and
in view of the well-known attitude of the Government of Great
Britain, to prefer British assistance to any other;

For these reasons, the Arab nation has decided to approach the
Government of Great Britain with a request for the approval, through
one of their representatives if they think fit, of the following basic
provisions which, as time presses, have not been made to include
matters of relatively smaller importance, since such matters can wait
until the time comes for their consideration: —

(1) Great Britain recognises the independence of the Arab
countries which are bounded : on the north, by the line Mersin-Adana
to parallel 37 degree N. and thence along the line Birejik — ^Urfa—
Mardin — ^Mdiat — Jazirat (ibn ‘Umar) — Amadia to the Persian
frontier; on the east, by the Persian frontier down to the Persian
Gulf ; on the south, by the Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden
whose status will remain as at present) ; on the west, by the Bed Sea
and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin.

(2) Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab
Caliphate for Islam.

(3) The Sharifian Arab Government undertakes, other things
being equal, to grant Great Britain preference in all economic enter-
prises in the Arab countries.

(4) With a view to ensuring the stability of Arab independence
and the efficacy of the promised preference in economic enterprises,
the two contracting parties undertake, in the event of any foreign
state attacking either of them, to come to each other’s assistance with,
all the resources of their military and naval forces; it being under-
stood that peace "will be concluded only when both parties concur.

In the event of one of the two parties embarking upon a war of
offence, the other party will adopt an attitude of neutrality, but, if
invited to join, will agree to confer with the other party as to the
conditions of joint action.

(5) Great Britain agrees to the abolition of Capitulations in the
Arab eomitries, and undertakes to assist the Sharifian Government in
summoning an international congress to decree their abolition.

(6) Clauses 3 and 4 of the present Agreement are to remain in
force for a period of fifteen years. Should either party desire an
extension, due notice of one year before the expiry of that period will
have to be given.

^ Therefore, since the entire Arab nation is (God be praised*)
umted in its resolve to pursue its noble aim to the end, at whatever
cc^t, It requests the Government of Great Britain to return an answer
whether nega,tively or in the affirmative, within thirty days of the
receipt of this menage in default of which it reserves its right to
freedom of action, just ^ we will consider ourselves absolved

declaration which we made earlier

CompUments,

16

No. 2

Sir Henry McMahon’s First Note To The Sharif Husain.

Cairo, August 30, 1915.

Complimentary titles.

We have the honour to tender the gratitude due to you for
the sentiments of sincere friendship for England which you display,
and it pleases us, moreover, to learn that Your Lordship and your
people are at one in believing that Arab interests are in harmony with
British interests, and vice-versa.

In earnest of this, we hereby confirm to you the declaration of
Lord ^Kitchener as communicated to you through ‘Ali Efifendi, in
which was manifested our desire for the independence of the Arab
countries and their inhabitants, and our readiness to approve an Arab
caliphate upon its proclamation.

We now declare once more that the Government of Great Britain
would welcome the reversion of the caliphate to a true Arab born of
the blessed stock of the Prophet.

As for the question of frontiers and boundaries, negotiations
would appear to be premature and a waste of time on details at this
stage, with the War in progress and the Turks in effective occupation
of the greater part of those regions. All the more so as a party of
Arabs inhabiting those very regions have, to our amazement and
sorrow, overlooked and neglected this valuable and incomparable
opportunity; and, instead of coming to our aid, have lent their
assistance to the Germans and the Turks; to that new despoiler, the
German, and to that tyrannical oppressor, the Turk.

Nevertheless, we are fully prepared to despatch to Your Lord-
ship whatever quantities of grain and other charitable gifts may be
owed by Egypt to the Holy Land of Arabia and the noble Arabs.
These will be forwarded, on a sign from Your Lordship, to whatever
locality you may indicate.

We have made the necessary arrangements for facilitating the
journeys of your messenger to us.

Compliments,

16

No. 3

The Sharif Husain’s Second Nete To Sir Henry McMahon.

Mecca, Shawwal 29, 1333.
(September 9, 1915).

COMPLIMENTABT TITLES.

We received your note of the 19th Shawwal, (August 30,) with
gratification, and have given it the fullest consideration, _ notwith-
standing the obscurity and the signs of lukewarmth and hesitancy we
descried in it in regard to our essential clause. We find it necessary
to affirm to Your Excellency our sentiments of amity with Great
Britain and our readiness to ensure her a favoured place in all cir-
cumstances and in every manner, for in that way can the true
interests of our co-religionists best be served.

Your Excellency will suffer me to say, in expanation of what
I mean by lukewarmth and hesitancy, that your statements in regard
to the question of frontiers and boundaries — namely that to discuss
them at this stage were unprofitable and could only result in a waste
of time since those regions are still occupied by their sovereign
government, and so forth — ^reflect what I might almost describe as
reluctance or something akin to reluctance, on your part.

The fact is that the proposed frontiers and boundaries represent
not the suggestions of one individual whose claim might well await
the conclusion of the War, but the demands of our people who believe
that those frontiers form the minimum necessary to the establishment
of the new order for which they are striving. This they are deter-
mined to obtam; and they have decided to discuss the matter, in the
first resort, with that Power in whom they place their greatest confi-
dence and reliance, and whom they regard as the pivot of justice,
namely Great Britain.

In this, they are moved by considerations of the reciprocity of
interests, the requirements of territorial organisation, and the wishes
of the populations concerned ; and also by their desire to see the
foundations of their future life settled beforehand, so as to avoid
finding themselves, when their new life is being established and
orgamsed, m opposition to or conflict with Great Britain or one of
her allies— which God forbid. It should be noted that, in drawing
up aeir propo^d delimitation, they have not outstepped the bounds
of the regions inhabited by their race.

For our aim, 0 respected Minister, is to ensure that the eondi-
tions wMch are essential to our future shaU be secured on a foundation
of reahty, md not on highly-decorated phrases and titles. As for the

thStt. ^ Moslems for

I am coiifid.6iit tliat Your Excolloncv *will ti

doubt that I have had nothing to do with the nronosin^^ ^
boundaries, which include oJy populations of C^raSf tS

17

they were proposed by our people who regard them as being, to put
it briefly, vitally and economically essential — as indeed they are.

In conclusion, we believe in aU sincerity that your loyalty will
prevail, whether you are satisfied with us or displeased ; and that you
will not wish to seize upon the fact that some of our people are still
with the utmost zeal furthering Ottoman designs, as stated in your
letter under reference, as an excuse for treating our aspirations with
such lukewarmness and hesitancy. I think Your Excellency is above
denying that our demands are fundamental, nay, that they are the
very substance and essence of our existence, be it from the material,
the spiritual or the moral point of view. Up to this very moment, I
have been endeavouring, in person and with all my powers, to enforce
the prescriptions of our Sacred Law in my country and in all that
concerns me in relation to the rest of the empire, until G-od issue His
decree.

For these reasons, and the better to set your mind at ease, I may
state that the people of all those countries, including those of whom
you say that they are zealously furthering German and Ottoman
designs, are awaiting the result of the present negotiations, which
depend solely upon whether you reject or admit the proposed
frontiers, and upon whether or not you will help us to secure their
spiritual and other rights against evil and danger. Please commu-
nicate to us the decision of the British Government on this point,
for our guidance as to what suits their policy, and as to what steps
it behoves us to take. For the rest, it is God Who decrees the past
and the future. He ordains all things, exalted be His Name!

With regard to our request for the despatch of the people’s
bounty, with the customary purses from the Ministry of Auqaf and
all that it is usual to send with the Pilgrimage convoy, I had
in view that their despatch would be a means of substantiating the
terms of your ppelamations to the world, and more particularly the
Moslem world, in which you stated that your hostility was solely
directed against the usurpers of the caliphate and, hence, of the
rights of all Moslems. To say nothing of the fact that the said
bounty comes from specific endowments which have nothing to do
with politics. If you decide to send them, let the bounty due on
account of the past two years be consigned in a special steamer to
Jedda as usual in the name of the people, and let the master
or the special officer who is usually charged year by year with
the duty of delivery communicate with the authorities at Jedda
on arrival at the port, and ask for the competent official who is to
take delivery of the grain against the proper receipt to be signed
by the receiving officer. It should be noted that only the signature
of that officer may be accepted, and the skipper or special officer
should be instructed that if any obstruction is attempted, he should
threaten to return with his cargo to the port of departure The
consignment is to be formally received by the committee known’ as the
the “Committee for dealing with the People’s Bounty.”

If you should wish to reply to this note, let the reply be sent
by the bearer.

Compliments,

18

No. 4

Sir Henry McMahon’s Second Note To The Sharif Husain.

Cairo, October 24, 1915.

COMPLIMKNTAEY TITLES.

I have, with gratification and pleasure, received your note of
the 29th Shawwal, 1333, and its tokens of sincere friendship have
filled me with satisfaction and contentment.

I regret to find that you inferred from my last note that my
attitude toward the question of frontiers and boundaries was one of
hesitancy and lukewarmth. Such was in no wise the intention of
my note. All I meant was that I considered that the time had not
yet come in which that question could be discussed in a conclusive
manner.

But, having realised from your last note that you considered the
question important, vital and urgent, I hastened to communicate to
the Government of Great Britain the purport of your note. It gives
me the greatest pleasure to convey to you, on their behalf, the follow-
ing declarations which, I have no doubt, you will receive with
satisfaction and acceptance.

The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of
Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and
Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account
be excepted from the proposed delimitation.

Subject to that modification, and without prejudice to the
treaties concluded between us and certain Arab Chiefs, we accept
that delimitation.

As for the regions lying within the proposed frontiers, in which
Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her
ally France, I am authorised to give you the following pledges on
behalf of the Government of Great Britain, and to reply as follows
to your note:

(1) That, subject to the modifications stated above. Great
Britain is prepared to reco^ise and uphold the independence of the
Arabs in all the regions lying within the frontiers proposed by the
Sharif of Mecca;

(2) That Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against
all external aggression, and 'will recognise the obligation of preserving
them from aggression;

(3) That, when circumstances permit. Great Britain will help
the Arabs with her advice and assist them in the establishment of
governments to suit those diverse regions;

(4) That it IS understood that the Arabs have already decided
to seek the counsels and advice of Great Britain exclusively; and that
such European advisers and officials as may be needed to establish a
sound system of admmistration shall be British;

19

(5) That, as regards the two vilayets of Baghdad and of Basra,
the Arabs recognise that the fact of Great Britain's established
position and interests there will call for the setting up of special
administrative arrangements to protect those regions from foreign
aggression, to promote the welfare of their inhabitants, and to safe-
guard our mutual economic interests.

I am confident that this declaration will convince you, beyond
all doubt, of Great Britain's sympathy with the aspirations of her
friends the Arabs; and that it will result in a lasting and solid
alliance with them, of which one of the immediate consequences will
be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the
liberation of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which has
weighed on them all these long years.

I have confined myself in this note vital questions of primary
importance. If there are any other matters in your notes, which have
been overlooked, we can revert to them at some suitable time in the
future.

I have heard with great satisfaction and pleasure that the
Sacred Kiswa and the charitable gifts which had gone with it, had
arrived safely and that, thanks to your wise directions and arrage-
ments, they were landed without trouble or damage in spite of the
risks and difficulties created by the present deplorable war. We
pray Almighty God that He may bring a lasting peace and freedom
to mankind.

I am sending this note with your faithful messenger, Shaikh
Muhammad ibn 'Aref ibn ‘Uraifan, who will lay before you certain
interesting matters which, as they are of secondary importance, I
have abstained from mentioning in this note.

Compliments.

No- 5

The Sharif Husain s Third Note To Sir Henry McMahon.

Mecca, Zul-Hejja 27, 1333.
(Novembers, 1915).

COMPLIMENTAIty TITLES.

'With great gratification have we recived your note of the 15th
Zul-Hejja (October 24) to which we would reply as follows:

First, in order to facilitate agreement and serve the cause of
Islam by the removal of possible sources of hardship and tribulation,
and in earnest of the particular esteem in which we hold Great
Britain, we no longer insist on the inclusion of the districts of Mersin
and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. As for the vilavets of Aleppo
and Bairut and their western maritime coasts, these are purely Arab
provinces in which the Moslem is indistinguishable from the Christian,

20

for they are both the descendants of one forefather. And we Moslems
intend, in those provinces, to follow the precepts laid down by the
Commander of the Faithful, ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (God have mercy
upon him!), and the caliphs who come after him, when he enjoined
upon the Moslems to treat the Christians on a footing with themselves,
saying: they are to enjoy the same rights and bear the same obliga-
tions as ourselves. They will have, moreover, their denominational
privileges, as far as the public interest allows

Secondly, since the provinces of Ii*aq were part of the former
Arab Empire, and indeed were the seat of government in the days
of the CaKph ‘Ali ibn Abi-Talib (God’s favour be upon him!')
and of all the caliphs after him; and since it was in those very
provinces (and more pai'ticularly in Basra w'hieh was the first centre
of Arab culture) that the civilisation of the Arabs and the expansion
of their power flourished — a fact gives them in the eyes of all Arabs,
both far and near, the precious significance of an unforgetable
heritage; for these reasons, we should find it impossible to persuade
or compel the Arab nation to renounce that honourable association.
On the other hand, since the safeguards referred to in your clause 5
concerning Great Britain’s interests are naturally secured — for the
safeguarding of British interests with which are bound up our own
is one of our main concerns — we should be willing, in our desire
to facilitate agreement, to allow those parts which are now occupied
by British troops to remain so occupied for a period to be determined
by negotiation, without prejudice to the rights of either party or
injujpr to the natural wealth and resources of those parts. It being
provided that, during the period of the occupation, the Arab King-
dom shall receive suitable pecuniary assistance towards the burden
of expenditure which a nascent kingdom inevitably has to bear ; and
that the agreements in force with certain Chiefs in those parts will
be respected.

Thirdly, your advocacy of speedy action seems to us to entail
risks as well as advantages. In the first place, premature action
might give rise among those Moslems who do not as yet appreciate
the realities of the situation, to the criticism that, by proelaimaing
a revolt, we are seeking the disruption of Islam. In the second
place, we have to consider what our position would be against Turkey
who is aided by all the might of Germany, in the event of one of
the Entente Powers weakening to the extent of being compelled to
make peace with the Central Powers; what attitude would Great
Britain and her remaining allies adopt to preclude the possibility
the Arab nation being left alone to face Turkey and her alHes?

no ^lety had the conflict lain between us
and the Turks alone. These aspects of the question have to be
considered especially as, if we were to enter the tWar in an informal
way. It might be contended by some of the belligerents that they have
a right, m concluding the peace, to interfere in our affairs*

Fourthly, &e Arabs firmly believe that, after the War the
German-ridden Turks will try to give them constant provo^tiom i^
religious as well as temporal matters, and to wreak the utmost
vengeance upon them. On their side, the Arabs have reSvSZd

21

vowed to fight the Turks and continue fighting them until not one
of them (save women and children) remains in any of the Arab
countries. Our present deliberation is on account of the considera-
tions stated above.

Fifthly, the moment the Arabs feel confident that, when the time
comes for the conclusion of peace in Europe, Great Britain and her
allies will not leave them in the lurch face to face with Turkey and
Germany, but that they intend to help them and advocate their case
effectively in the peace negotiations, from that moment will Arab
participation in the War undoubtedly serve the general Arab interest.

Sixthly, our previous communication dated the 29th Shawwal,
1333, makes it superfluous for us to reply to clauses 8 and 4 of your
letter, relating to forms of administration, advisers and oflGicials,
especially as it is clear from Your Excellency’s declarations that there
will be no interference in our internal affairs.

Seventhly, we request a clear and final reply, in the shortest
possible time, to the questions and problems set forth above, so that
the necessary action may be taken with the least possible delay. In
our desire to secure agreement which should be satisfactory to both
sides, we have gone to the furthest lengths of concession. For we
know that the outcome of this war for us can only be either to achieve
victory, which will secure to the Arabs a life worthy of their ancient
glory, or to find destruction in the attempt. Were it not for the
determination shown by the Arabs to realise their aspirations, I would
have elected to retire to some mountain-top. But they pressed me
to lead the movement to its goal.

No, 6

Sir Henry McMahon’s Third Note To The Sharif Husain.

Cairo, December 13, 1915.

Complimentary tetlis.

Tour note of the 27th Zul-Hejja, 1333, has reached me, and I
was glad to find that you consent to the exclusion of the vilayets of
Mersin and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab countries.

I have also received with the utmost pleasure and satisfaction
your assurances that the Arabs are resolved on following the precepts
of the Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (the blessing of God be upon
himl) and of the other early caliphs which guarantee equal rights
and privil^es to all creeds alike.

Your statement that the Arabs are prepared to recognise and
respect all our treaties with other Arab Chiefs is of course taken to
apply to all territories to be included within the frontiers of the
Arab Kingdom, for Great Britain cannot repudiate agreements
already concluded between her and those Chiefk

22

As for the two vilayets of Aleppo and Bairut, the Government
of Great Britain have fully understood your statement in that respect
and noted it with the greatest care. But as the interests of their
ally France are involved in those two provinces, the question noils
for careful consideration. We shall communicate again with you
on this subject, at the appropriate time.

The Government of Great Britain, as T have previously informed
you, are prepared to give all the guarantees and assistance in their
power to the Arab Kingdom. But their interests in the Vilayet of
Baghdad necessitated a friendly and stable administration, such as
you have outlined. The proper safeguarding of those interests calls
for further and more detailed consideration than the present situation
and the speed with which these negotiations are being conducted
permit.

We_ fully approve your desire to proceed warily, and do not
wish to impel you to hasty action which might obstruct the success
of your objectives. But, at the same time, we deem it imperative
that you should turn your endeavour to uniting the Arab peoples to
our joint cause and to urging them to abstain from aiding our
enemies in any manner whatsoever. On the success of your
endeavours, and on the efiSeiency of the measures which, when the
time comes, the Arabs will find it possible to take in aid of our
cause, will the strength and permanence of our agreement depend.

In these circumstances, the Government of Great Britain have
authorised me to declare to your Lordship that you may rest confident
that Great Britain does not intend to conclude any peace whatsoever,
of which the freedom of the Arab peoples and their liberation from
German and Turkish domination do not form an essential condition.

In token of our good faith, and as a contribution to your
endeavour in our joint cause, I am sending the sum of £. 20,000 with
your trusted messenger.

No. 7

The Sharif Husain’s Fourth Note To Sir Henry McMahon.

Mecca, Safar 25, 1334.
(January 1, 1916).

OOMPLIMBNTABY TVILBS.

191 5^ S your note of the 9th Safar, 1334 (December 13,

contents which have

21? the utmost ptasfaction and gratification, inasmuch as

teey set my mmd at rest over one point, namely the arrival of
Muhmmad Sharif al-Faruqi and his interview with you You will
now have satisfied yourself that our attitude w^ not urouS^ w

23

of the decisions taken and the desires expressed by our people; md
that our role in the matter was eonjSned to conveying and putting
into effect those desires and decisions, thus merely discharging a
duty with which our people had invested us. It is, in my view,
most important that Your Excellency should realise that.

As for your statements concerning Iraq and the compensation
to be paid during the period of occupation, I would illustrate the
friendly sentiments animating us towards Great Britain and the
confidence we repose in her, both in word and in deed, in the spirit
as well as the letter, by leaving the assessment of the compensation
to her wisdom and sense of fair play.

With regard to the northern parts and their coastal regions, we
have already stated, in our previous note, the utmost that it was
possible for us to modify. We made those modifications solely in
order to achieve the ends which, Almighty God willing, we desire to
attain. In that same spirit, we have felt bound to steer clear of
that which might have impaired the alliance between Great Britain
and Prance and their concord during the calamities of the present
war. On the other hand — and this Your Excellency must clearly
understand — ^we shall deem it our duty, at the earliest opportunity
after the conclusion of the War, to claim from you Bairut and its
coastal regions which we will overlook for the moment on account
of Prance.

I find it superfluous to point out that this arrangement also
serves Great Britain's interests best; that it safeguards them as fully
— i£ not more — as it secures our rights; and that no other arrange-
ment is possible by which it could fall to Great Britain to achieve
the aim, which she has at heart, of seeing her friends in contentment
and happiness. All the more so as the proximity of the Preneh
to us would be a source of difficulties and disputes such as would
render the establishment of peaceful conditions impossible. To say
nothing of the fact that the people of Bairut arc resolutely opposed
to such a dismemberment, and would drive us to take a stand which
might cause concern and trouble to Great Britain on a scale not far
short of her present preoccupations, owing to what we firmly believe
to be the community, and indeed the identity, of your interests and
our own, and to be the only explanation of our unwillingness to deal
with anyone else but Great Britain in these negotiations.

Thus any concession designed to give Prance or any other Power
possession of a ^single square foot of territory in those parts is quite
out of the question. In proclaiming this, I place all my reliance on
the declarations which concluded your note, and this reliance is such
that, at our death, it shall be inherited by those who live after us.

Your Excellency may rest assured, and Great Britain may rest
assured, that we sh^ adhere to our resolve to which reference has
already been made, and which was made known to Storrs — ^that able
and accomplished man — ^two years ago. We are only waiting for an
opportunity in consonance with our situation. It appears to be
drawing nearer, and the hand of destiny seems to be driving it

towards us in timely and mmistaJiable fasMon, as thougli to provide
us and those who think like us with weapons for meeting the criticism
and facing the responsibilities in store.

Your statement that you do not wish to impel us to hasty action
which might obstruct the success of your objectives renders further
explanation superfluous, except that we shall have to let you know
in due course our requirements in the way of arms, ammunition and
so forth.

Compliments.

No. 8

Sir Henry McMahon’s Fourth Note To The Sharif Hnsain.

Cairo, January 30, 1916.

COMPLIMBNTABy lOTLES.

■With great pleasure and satisfaction have we received your note
of the 25th Safar, 1334, from the hand of your faithful messenger
who never fails to give us your oral messages as well. We fiJly
realise and appreciate the motives which animate you in the
momentous issue with which we are concerned, and we do not question
the fact that you are working for the good of the Arab nation vdthout
any ulterior motive whatsoever.

We have noted what you say with r^ard to the Vilayet of
Baghdad, and we shall examine the matter with the utmost care aftmr
the defeat of the enemy, when the time comes for the conclusion
of peace.

As for the norther regions, we note with great satisfaction your
desire to avoid anything that might impair the alliance between
Great Britam md France. It has not escaped you that it is our
firm determination not to allow an 3 rthing, however amnll, to stand in
the way of our ending this war in complete victory. Moreover, when
victory is attained, the friendship between Great Britain and France
will be stronger and closer than ever, cemented as it will have been
by the sheding of British and French blood— the blood of those who
have fallen fighting side by side in the cause of ri g h t and freedom.

Kie Arab countries are now associated in that noble aim which
can be attamed by uniting our forces and acting in nnianTT We
pray God that ^ccess may bind us to each other in a lasting friend-
ship which Shan brnig profit and contentment to us all

* 1 , glud to hear that you are endeavouring to gain all

tte Arab tab® over to our joint cause, and to prev^theSto

it to your discretion

You will doubtless inform us, through the bearer of this note,
of the ways in which we can help you. You may rest assured that
all your requests will always be carefully considered and mosit
expeditiously de^t with.

You will surely have heard that Sayyed Ahmad al-Sharif, the
Sanusi, has lent an ear to the intrigues of our enemies and started
hostilties against us, and you will doubtless be sorry to hear that
he has so far lost sight of Arab int^ests that he has thrown in his
lot with our enemies. He has now fallen a victim to his own
misguided ways, and met with adversity at every turn. This may
yet convince him of his error and lead him ba(^ into the path of
reason and of peace, out of pity for his poor foUoweBS whom he is
guiding to destruction.

Your faithful messenger who carries this note to you will give
you all our news.

CompUmmts.

26

Appendix (B)

THE ANGLO— FRANCO— RUSSIAN AGREEMENT.

(April-May 1916)

Generally known as
THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT.

(The Sykes-Picot Agreement was concluded in the form of
diplomatic notes exchanged between the Governments of the three
Powers, in wMeh the claims of each Power to portions of the Ottoman
Empire, after its dismemberment were recognised by the other two.
Notes defining the Russian share were exchanged in Petrograd on
April 26, 1916, between the Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Sazonoff)
and the French Ambassador (M. Pal4ologue), and in London a few
weeks later between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir
Edward Grey) and the Russian Ambassador (Count Benkendorff).
Notes defining the British and French shares were exchanged in
London on May 9 and May 16, between Sir Edward Grey and the
French Ambassador (M. Paul Gambon).

The text reproduced below is only that of the Anglo-French
section of the Agreement, since that section alone dealt with the
future of Arab territories. It is a translation of the French version
published in A. Giannini, Doeumenti per la Storia della Pace
orientale, Rome, 1933).

TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT.

Concluded in London on May 16, 1916,

1. France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and
uphold an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States
in the areas shown as (A) and (B) on the annexed map, under the
suzerainty of an Arab Chief. France in area (A) and Great Britain
in area (B) shall have a right of priority in enterprises and local
loans. France in area (A) and Great Britain in area (B) pball
alone supply foreign advisers or officials on the request of the Arab
State or the Confederation of Arab States.

2. France in the Blue area and Great Britain in the Red area
shall be at liberty to establish such direct or indirect administration
or control as they may desire or as they may deem fit to establish
after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States

3. In the Brown area there shall be established an international
afimumtration of which the form will be decided upon after consulta-
tion vnth Russia, and after subsequent agreement with the other aiHcb
and the representatives of the Sharif of Mecca.

27'

4. There shall be accorded to Great Britain

(a) The ports of Haifa and Acre;

(b) Guarantee of a specific supply of water from the
T%ris and the Euphrates in area (A) for area (B).

His Majesty’s Government, on their part, undertake that they will
at no time initiate negotiations for the concession of Cyprus to any
third Power without the previous consent of the French Government.

5. Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the
British Elupire and there shall be no differentiation in treatment
with regard to port dues or the extension of special privileges affecting
British shipping and commerce ; there shall be freedom of transit for
British goods through Alexandretta and over railways through the
Blue area, whether such goods are going to or coming from the Red
Mea, area (A) or area (B) ; and there shall be no differentiation
in treatment, direct or indirect, at the expense of British goods on
any railway or of British goods and shipping in any port serving
the areas in question.

Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her
colonies and protectorates, and there shall be no differentiation in
treatment or privilege with regard to port dues against French
shipping and commerce. There shall be freedom of transit through
Haifa and over British railways through the Brown area, whether
such goods are coming from or going to the Blue area, area (A) or
area (B), and there shall be no differentiation in treatment, direct
or indirect, at the expense of French goods on any railway or of
French goods and shipping in any port serving the areas in question.

o. In area (A), the Baghdad Railway shall not be extended
northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad
with Aleppo along the basin of the Euphrates will have been
completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two
Governments.

JJ- ^eat Britain shall have the right to build, administer and
be the wle owner of the railway connecting Haifa with area (B),
bhe shall have, in addition, the right in perpetuity and at all times
of carrymg troops on that line. It is understood by both Govern-
ments thut this railway is intended to facilitate communication
between Baghdad ^d Haifa, and it is further understood that in
the event of tech^l difficulties and expenditure incurred in the
mamtenance of this fee in the Brown area rendering ttie execution
of the project impracticable, the Frendh Government will be prepared
to consider plans for enabli^ the line in question to traverse the

polygon fo^ed by ^las-Umm Qais-Salkhad-Tall ‘Osda-Mismieh
before reaching area (B).

8. For a period of twenty years, the Turkish customs tariff shaU
remain in force throughout the Blue and Red areas as weU
areas (A) md (B) and no mcrease in the rates of duties and no
alteration of ad valorem duties into specific duties shall
without the consent of the two Powers ^

There shall be no internal customs barriers betwem any of the
areas mentioned above, the customs duties to be levied on goods
destined for the interior shall be collected at the ports of entry and
remitted to the Administration of the area of destination.

9. It is understood that the French Gtovemment will at no
time initiate any ii^otiations for the cession of their r^hts and
•will not cede their prospective rights in the Blue area to any third
Power other than Ihe Arab State or Confederation of Arab States,
without the previous consent of His Majesty’s Government who, on
their part, give the French Government a similar undertaking in
respect of the Bed area.

10. The British and French Governments shall agree to abstain
from acquiring and to withhold their consent to a third Power
acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian Peninsula; nor shall
they consent to the construction by a third Phwer of a naval base
in the islands on the eastern seaboard of the Red Sea. This, however,
will not prevent such rectification of the Aden boundary as might
be found necessary in ■view of the recent Turkish attack.

% 11. The negotiations with the Arab States shall be pursued

through the same channel as heretofore in the name of the two Powers.

12. It is understood, moreover, that measures for controlling
the importation of arms into the Arab territory will be considered
by the two Governments.

Areas referred to in the text by lettere or eolowre are at
^leens—

Bhfe Area; Cilicia, Ijebanon.

Bed Areai Vilayets of Baghdad and Basra.

Srmm Arm: Pdlettiise.

A. . Arm : Present Syrian State and Mosul Vilayat excluding KiAuk.

B. Arm ; Transjordan and desert area extending to Hit and Kirkuk.

29

Appendix (C)

PROCLAMATION.

To the People of the Baghdad Vilayat.

In the name of my J^ing and in the name of the peoples over
whom he rules, I address you as follows: —

Our military operations have as their object the defeat of the
enemy and the driving of him from these territories. In order to
complete this task I am charged with absolute and supreme control
of all regions in which British Forces operate, but our Armies have
not come into your Cities and Lands as Conquerors, or enemies, but
as Liberators.

Since the days of Hulaku your Citi;5ens have been subject to
the tyranny of strangers, your palaces have fallen into ruins, your
gardens have sunken in desolation and your forefathers and yourselves
have groaned in bondage. Your sons have been carried off to wars
not of your seeking, your wealth has been stripped from you by
unjust men and squandered in distant places.

Since the days of Midhat Pasha the Turks have talked of reforms
yet do not the ruins and wastes of to-day testify to the vanity of
those promises?

It is the wish, not only of my King and his peoples, but it is
also the wish of the Great Nations with whom he- is in alliance, that
you should prosper, even as in the past, when your lands were
fertile, when your ancestors gave to the world literature, science and
art and Baghdad was one of the wonders of the world.

Between your people and the Dominions of my King there has
been a close bond of interest and for 200 years have the Merchants
of Baghdad and Great Britain traded together in mutual profit and
friendship. On the other hand, the Germans and Turks, who have
despoiled you and yours, have for 20 years made Baghdad a centre
of power from which to assail the power of the British and the
Allies of the British in P'ersia and Arabia. Therefore, the British
Government cannot remain indifferent as to what takes place in your
country, now or in the future, for, in duty to the interests of the
British people and their Allies, the British Government cannot risk
that being done in Baghdad again which has been done by the Turks
and Germans during the war.

But you, the people of Baghdad, whose commercial professions
and whose safety from oppression and invasion must ever be a matter
of the closest concern to the British Government, are not to under-
stand that it is the wish of the British Government, to impose upon
you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British Government
that the aspirations of your philosophers and writers shall be realised
once again. The people of Baghdad shall flourish and enjoy their
wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance
with their sacred laws and their racial ideals. In the Hejaz the

30

Arabs have expelled the Turks and Germans who oppressed them
and have proclaimed Sharif Hussein as their King and His Lorddiin
rules in mdependenee and freedom and is the ally of the Nations who
are fighting against the power of Turkey and Germany, So indeed
me once more to greatness and renown amongst the peoples of the
Barth and that it shall bind itself to this end in unity and concord.

* 1 , perished in the cause of freedom at

the hands of those alien rulers, the Turks, who oppressed tTiAm jt
IS the determination of the Government of Great Britain and the
Great Powers allied to Great Britain that these noble Ajrabs shall
not have si-iffered in vaui. It is the desire and hope of the British
people and Nations in alliance with them that the Arab race mav
rise once more to greatness and renown amongst the people of the

co^or^^ ^

T, ® f Baghdad. Remember that for 26 generations vou

ave suffered under strange tyrants who have ever endeavoured to
set one ^ab house ^amst another in order that they might profit bv
^ur dissensions. Therefore, I am conmmanded to invite ven
through your Nobles and Elders and Representatives, to participate
m the nmagement of your civil affairs in collaboration^ with Ve
Pohtical Representatives of Great Britaia who aecompmiy the British
Army so that you may unite with your kinsmen in the North ■fi’nof

South and West in realising the aspiratio™ yL ™'^’ ’

P. S. MAUDE, Lxeut-Genhraii,
Command^ British Forces m Iraq.

Army Headquarters,
Baghdad.

the 19th March, 1917.
(24th Jomadi-al-Awal, 1335).

#

Appendix (D)

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION.

His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment
in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use
then* best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may
prejudice the civil md religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed
by Jews in any other country.

32

Appendix (E)

COMMUNICATION FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
TO THE KING OF THE HEJAZ

(The text of the original communication has often appeared in
the Arabic Press in facsimile reproduction from a photostat copy
supplied by the late King Hussein) .

The original communication was in Arabic.

The Acting British Agent, Jedda to the King Husain.

Jedda, February 8, 1918.

COMPLIMENTABY TITLES.

I am directed by His Britannic Majesty ’s High Commissioner (l)
to forward to Your Majesty the text of a telegraphic message which
His Excellency has had from the Foreign Office in London for
transmission as a communication from His Britannic Majesty’s
Government to Your Majesty. The text is verbatim as follows:

Begins. The loyal motives which have prompted Your Majesty
to forward to the High Commissioner the letter addressed by the
Turkish commander-in-chief in Syria to His Highness the Amir
Faisal and to Ja’far Pasha have caused His Majesty’s Government
the liveliest satisfaction. The steps taken by Your Majesty in this
eoimexion are only a token of the frienship and mutual sincerily
which have always inspired the relations between the Government
of the Hejaz and His Majesty’s Government. It would be super-
fluous to point out that the object aimed at by Turkey is to sow doubt
and suspicion between the Allied Powers and those Arabs who, under
Your Majesty’s leadership and guidance, are striving nobly to
recover their ancient freedom. The Turkish policy is to create
dissension by luring the Arabs into believing that the Allied Powers
have designs on the Arab countries, and by representing to the Allies
that the Arabs might be made to renounce their aspirations. But
luch intrigues cannot succeed in sowing dissension among those whose
minds are directed by a common purpose to a common end.

His Majesty’s Government and their allies stand steadfastly by
every cause aiming at the liberation of the oppressed nations, and
they are determined to stand by the Arab peoples in their struggle
for the establishment of an Arab world in which law replace
Ottoman injustice, and in which unity shall prevail over the rivalries
artificially provoked by the policy of Turkish officials. His Majesty’s
Government re-affirm their former pledge in regard to the liberation

(1) le.. Sir Beginald Wingate, High Oommissioner for Egypt.

33

of the Arab peoples. His Majesty’s Govemment have hitherto made
it their policy to ensure that liberation, and it remains the policy
they are determined unflinchingly to pursue by protecting such Arabs
as are already liberated from all dangers and perils, and by misting
those who are still under the yoke of the tyrants to obtain their
freedom. Ends.

Compliments.

J. E. BASSETT, Lr.-Con.,
Acting British Agent, Jedda.

t

34

Appendix (F)

THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT’S DECLARATION
TO THE SEVEN ARABS.

{June 16, 1918.)

(This Declaration was made in reply to a memorial submitted
to the Foreign Office, through the Arab Bureau in Cairo, by seven
Arab leaders domiciled in Egypt.

The Declaration was read out by an officer of the Arab Bureau
at a meeting of the seven Arab leaders, which had been specially
convened for the purpose on June 16, 1918, in Cairo.

In Arab circles this Declaration is usually known as the
Declaration to the Seven).

DECLARATION TO THE SEVEN.

His Majesty’s Government have considered the memorial of the
Seven with great care. They fully appreciate the reasons for the
desire of its authors to retain their anonymity, (i) but the fact that
the memorial is anonymous has in no way detracted from the value
which His Majesty’s Government assign to that document.

The territories mentioned in the memorial fall into four
categories : —

(i) Territories which were free and independent before
the outbreak of the War;

(ii) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the
Arabs themselves;

(hi) Territories liberated from Turkish rule by the
action of the Allied armies;

(iv) Territories still under Turkish rule.

With regard to the first two eat^ories, (2) His Majesty’s
Government recognise the complete and sovereign independence of
of the Arabs inhabiting those territories, and support them in their
struggle for freedom.

With regard to the territories occupied by the AlliAfl armies, (8)
His Majesty’s Government invite the attention of the memorialists to
the proclamations issued by the commander-in-chief on the occasions

ShaiHi Kamel al-Qaesab: Miildita*
Shabandax; Khaled al-Haldmj Pauzi' al-Bafai;

aorth Peninsula, and the Hejaz as far

*^,.stfement xm issued, those territories comprised

balf^c^ PaSe

35

of the capture of Baghdad (March 19, 1917) and of the capture of
Jerusalem (December 9, 1917). These proclamations define the
policy of His Majesty’s Government towards the inhabitants of th(^e
regions, which is that the future government of those territories
should be based upon the principle of the consent of the governed.
This policy will always be that of His Majesty’s Government.

With regard to the territories in the fourth category, (4) it is
the desire of His Majesty’s Government that the oppressed peoples
in^ those territories should obtain their freedom and independence.
His Majesty’s Government will continue to work for the achievement
of that object. They are fully aware of the difficulties and perils
which threaten those who are striving for the (liberation?) (i) of the
inhabitants of those territories.

In spite of those obstacles, however. His Majesty’s Government
believe that the difficulties can be overcome, and they are prepared
to give every support to those who are striving to overcome them.
They are ready to consider any scheme of co-operation which does
not conflict with the military operations in hand or with the political
principles proclaimed by His Majesty’s Government and their allies.

(4) i.e., the hitherto unliberated portions of Iraq and Syria.

(1) This word is obscure- in the Arabic source.

i

36

Appendix (G)

ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION.

(February 8, 1918).

(Tliis Declaration 'was issued in Palestine, Syria and Iraq, in
the form of an official communique emanating from General Head-
quarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, dated November 7, 1918.

The text was given out to the Press, on the authority of the
militax’y censorship department, with institutions that it be given
special prominence. Copies of it were posted on the public notice-
boards in all tovms and a great many villages in the Arab territories
then occupied by the Allied forces, that is to say throughout the
length and breadth of Palestine, Syria and Iraq.

The Declaration appears to have been originally drawn up in
French. Official versions that have appeared in English are obvious
translations, not excluding that which was circulated in answer to
a question in the House of Commons on the 25th July 1921).

ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION.

November 7, 1918.

The goal envisaged by France and Great Britain in prosecuting
in the East the War set in train by German ambition is the complete
and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed
by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and
administrations that shall derive authority from the free exercise of
the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.

In pursuance of those intentions, France and Great Britain
agree to further and assist in the setting up of indigenous govern-
ments and administrations in Syria (i) and Mesopotamia (2) which
have already been liberted by the Allies, as well as in those territories
which they are endeavouring to liberate, and to recognise them as
soon as they are actually set up.

Far from wishing to impose this or that system upon the popula-
tions of those regions, their (i.e., France’s and Great Britain’s) only
concern is to offer such support and efficacious help as will ensure
the smooth working of the governments and administrations which
those populations will have elected of their o'wn free will to have;
to secure impartial and equal justice for all ; to facilitate the economic
development of the country by promoting and encouraging local
initiative; to foster the spread of education; and to put an end to
the dissensions which Turkish policy has for so long exploited. Such
is the task which the two Allied Powers wish to undertake in the
liberated territories.

(1) In offleial parlance, this name was still used to denote the whole of
geographical Syria, from the Taurus range to the Egyptian frontier.

(2) The term is used here to denote the region made up of the former Ottoman

nayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, which has throughout this book
been referred to (and is now universally known) as Iraqf

37

Appendix (H)

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN
GREAT BRITAIN AND ‘IRAQ.

His Majesty the King of Geeat Bettain^ Ieeland and the
British Dominions beyond the Seas, E'mperoe of India,

And His Majesty the King of ^Iraq,

Whereas they desire to consolidate the friendship and to
maintain and perpetuate the relations of good understanding between
their respective countries; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty undertook in the Treaty of
Alliance signed at Baghdad on the thirteenth day of January, One
thousand nine hundred and twenty-six of the Christian Bra, corres-
ponding to the twenty-eight day of Jamadi-al-Ukhra, One thousand
three hundred forty-four, Hijrah, that he would take into active
consideration at successive intervals of four years the question whether
it was possible for him to press for the admission of ‘Iraq into the
League of Nations; and

Whereas His Majesty ^s Government in Great Britain and
Northern Ireland informed the ‘Iraq Government without qualifica-
tion or proviso on the fourteenth day of September, One thousand
nine hundred and twenty-nine, that they were prepared to support
the candidature of ‘Iraq for admission to the League of Nations in
the year One thousand nine hundred and thirty-two, and announced
to the Council of the League on the fourth day of November, One
thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine, that this was their inten-
tion; and

Whereas the mandatory responsibilities accepted by His
Britannic Majesty in respect of ‘Iraq will automatically terminate
upon the admission of ‘Iraq to the League of Nations; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the ICing of
‘Iraq consider that the relation which will subsist between them as
independent sovereigns should be defined by the conclusion of a Treaty
of Alliance and Amity;

Have agreed to conclude a new Treaty for this purpose on terms
of complete freedom, equality, and independence which will become
operative upon the entry of ‘Iraq into the League of Nations, and
have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries: —

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Lieutenant Colonel Sir Francis Henry Humphrys, Knight

Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order, Knight Commander

of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint
George, Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the
British Empire, Companion of the Most Eminent Order of the
Indian Empire, High Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty-
in ‘Iraq; and

His Majesty the Kiko of 'Iraq:

General Xuri Pasha A1 Sa’id, Order of the Nahda, Second
Class, Order of the Istiqlal, Second Class, Companion of the
Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George,
Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, Prime Minister
of the ‘Iraq Government and Minister for Foreign Aftairs,

•who having communicated their full powers, found in due form, have
agreed as follows : —

Article 1.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship bet-ween His
Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq

There shall be established between the High Contracting Parties
a close alliance in consecration of their friendship, their cordial
understanding and their good relations, and there shall be full and
frank consultation between them in all matters of foreign policy
which may affect their common interests.

Each of the High Contracting Parlies undertakes not to adopt
in foreign countries an attitude which Ls inconsistent with the alliance
or might create difSeulties for the other party thereto.

Article 2.

Each High Contx'acting Party will be represented at the Court
of the other High Contracting Party by a diplomatic representative
duly accredited.

Article 3.

_ Should any dispute between ‘Iraq and a third State produced
a mtuation which involves the risk of a rupture with that State, the
High Contracting Parties will concert together with a view to the
settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means in accordance with
the pro^sion of the Convenant of the League of Nations and of other
mtemational obligations which may be applicable to the case.

.mcTiuLE

notwithstanding the prolusions of Article 3 above, either
Contracting Parties be engaged in war, the other High
below always to the provisions of Article 9

t ^ capacity of an ally. In

^ Contracting Parties

S ® necessary measures of defence.

iiSit “ til® ®^®iit of war or the

mmment menace of war wiU consist in furnishing to His Britannic

39

Majesty on ‘Iraq territory all facilities and assistance in his power,
including the use of railways, rivers, ports, aerodromes and means of
communication.

Article 5.

It is understood between the High Contracting Parties that
responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in ‘Iraq and
subject to the provisions of Article 4 above, for the defence of ‘Iraq
from external aggression, rests with His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq.
Nevertheless, His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq recognises that the per-
manent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the
essential communications of His Britannic Majesty is in the common
interest of the High Contracting Parties For this purpose, and in
order to facilitate the discharge of the obligations of His Britannic
Majesty under Article 4 above, His Majesty the King of ‘ Iraq under-
take to grant to His Britannic Majesty, for the duration of the
Alliance, sites for air bases to be selected by His Britannic Majesty
at or in the vicinity of Basrah and for an air base to be selected by
His Britannic Majesty to the west of the Euphrates. His Majesty
the King of ‘Iraq further authorises His Britannic Majesty to main-
tain forces upon ‘Iraq territory at the above localities in accordance
with the provisions of the Annexure of this Treaty, on the under-
standing that the presence of those forces shall not constitute in any
manner an occupation, and will in no waj' prejudice the sovereign
rights of ‘Iraq.

Article 6.

The Annexure hereto shall be regarded as an integral part of the
present Treaty.

Article 7.

This Treaty shall replace the Treaties of Alliance signed at
Baghdad on the tenth day of October, One thousand nine hundred
and twenty-two of the Christian Bra, corresponding to the nineteenth
day of Safar, One thousand three hundred and forty-one, Hijrah
and on the tiiirteenth day of January, One thousand nine hundred
and twenty-six of the Christian Era, corresponding to the twenty-
eighth day of Jamadi-al-Ukhra, One thousand three hundred and
forty-four, Hijrah, and the subsidiary agreements thereto, which
shall cease to have effect upon the entry into force of this Treaty It
shall be executed in duplicate, in the English and Arabic languages,
of which the former shall be regarded as the authoritative version.

Article 8.

_ The High Contracting Parties recognise that, upon the entry
into force of this Treaty, all responsibilities devolving under the
Treaties and Agreements referred to in Article 7 hereof upon His
Britannic Majesty in respect of ‘Iraq will, in so far as His Britannic
Majesty is concerned, then automatically and completely come to an
end, and that such responsibilities, in so far as they continue at all
will devolve upon His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq alone '

40

It is also recognised that all responsibilities devolving upon His
Britannic Majesty in respect of ‘Iraq under any other international
instruments, in so far as they continue at all, diould similarly devolve
upon His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq alone, and the High Contracting
Parties shall immediately take such steps as may be necessary to
secure the transference to His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq of these
responsibilities.

AnncLB 9.

Nothing in the present Treaty is intended to or shall in any way
prejudice the rights and obligations -which devolve, or may devolve,
upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of
the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War
signed at Paris on the twenty-seventh day of August, One thousand
nine hundred and twenty-eight.

Abti(3lb 10.

Should any difference arise relative to the appUeation or the
interpretation of this Treaty, and should the High Contracting
Parties fail to settle such difference by direct negotiation, then it shafi
be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of
the League of Nations.

Abtiolb 11.

This Treaty shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged
as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into force as soon as
‘Iraq has been admitted to membership of the League of Nations.

The present Treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty-
five years from the date of its coming into force. At any time after
twenty years from the date of the coming into force of this Treaty,
the High Contracting Parties wiU, at the request of either of them,
conclude a new Treaty which shall pro-dde for the continued main-
tenance and protection in all circumstances of the essential communi-
cations of His Britannic Majesty. In case of disagreement in this
matter the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League
of Nations.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the
present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Baghdad in duplicate this thirtieth day of june. One
thousand nine hundred and thirty, of the Christian Era, correspond-
ing to the fourth day of Safar, One thousand three hundred and
forty-nine, Hijrah.

P. H. HUMPHBTS.
NHRI AL SA’ID.

41

ANNEXURE TO TREATY OF ALLIANCE.

1

The strength of the forces maintained in ‘Iraq by His Britannic
Majesty, in accordance with the terms of Article 5 of this Treaty,
shall be determined by His Britannic Majesty from time to time after
consultation With His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq.

His Britannic Majesty shall maintain forces at Hinaidi for a
period of five year after the entry into force of this Treaty, in order
to enable His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq to organise the necessa^
forces to replace them. By the expiration of that period the said
forces of His Britannic Majesty shall have been withdrawn from
Hinaidi. It shall be also open to His Britannic Majesty to maintain
forces at Mosul for a maximum period of five years from the entry into
force of this Treaty. Thereafter it shall be open to His Britannic
Majesty to station his forces in the localities mentioned in Article 6
of this Treaty, and His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq wiU grant to His
Britannic Majesty, for the duration of the Alliance, leases of the
necessary sites for the accomodation of the forces of His Britannic
Majesty in those localities.

2

Subject to any modifications which the two High Contracting
Parties may agree to introduce in the future, the immunities and
privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters, including freedom from
taxation, enjoyed by the British forces in ‘Iraq will continue to ex-
tend to the forces referred to in Clause 1 above and to such of His
Britannic Majesty’s forces of all arms as may be in ‘Iraq in pursuance
of the present Treaty and its Annexure or otherwise by agreement
between the High Contracting Parties, and the existing provisions of
any local legislation affecting the armed forces of His Britannic
Majesty in ‘Iraq shall also continue. The Iraq Government will take
the necessary steps to ensure that the altered conditions will not
render the position of the British forces as regards immunities and
privileges in any way less favourable than that enjoyed by them at
the entry into force of this Treaty.

3

^ His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq agrees to provide all possible
facilities for the movement, training and maintenance of the forces
referred to in Clause 1 above, and to accord to those forces the same
facilities for the use of wireless telegraphy as those enjoyed by them
at the date of the entry into force of the present Treaty.

4

His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq undertakes to provide, at the
requ^t and at the expense of His Britannic Majesty, and upon such
conchtions as may be agreed to between the High Contracting Parties,
special guards from his own forces for the protection of such air bases
as may, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, be occupied

42

by the forces of His Britannic Majesty, and to secure the enactment
of such legislation as may be necessary for the fulfilment of the con-
ditions referred to above.

5

His Britannic Majesty undertakes to grant, whaiever they may
be required by His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq, all possible facilities
in the following matters, the cost of which will be met by His Majesty
the King of ‘Iraq: —

(1) Naval, military and aeronautical instruction of ‘Iraqi
Officers in the United Kingdom.

(2) The provision of arms, ammunition, equipment, ships and
aeroplanes of the latest available pattern for the forces of
His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq.

(3) The provision of British Naval, military and air force
officers to serve in an advisory capacity with the forces of
His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq.

«

In view of the desirability of identity in traming and methods
between the ‘Iraq and British armi^, His Majesty the King of ‘Iraq
undertakes that, should he deem it necessary to have recourse to
foreign instructors, these shall be chosen amongst British subjects.

He further undertakes that any personnel of his forces that may
be sent abroad for military training will be sent to military schools,
colleges and training centres in the territories of His Britannic
Majtsly, provided that this shall not prevent him from sending to
my other country such personnel as cannot be received in the said
institutions and training centres.

He further undertakes that the armament and essential equip-
ment of his forces shall not differ in type from those of the forces of
His Britannic Majesty.

tlis Majesty the Bang of ‘Iraq agrees to afford, when requested
to do so by ffis Britannic Majesty, all possible facilities for the move-
ment of the forces of His Britannic Majesty of all arms in transit
acr^ Ira^ and for the transport and storage of all supplies and
equipinmt that may be required by these forces during their passage,
across Iraq. These facilities shall cover the use of the roads,

terodromes of ‘Iraq, and His Britannic
Majwty s ^ps shall have general permission to visit the Shatt-al-
^ab on the imderstandmg that His Majesty the TTing of ‘Iraq is
sIyoxi prior notification of visit to ^Iraq ports.

43

Appendix (1)

PALESTINE WHITE PAPEE 1930

STATEMENT BY THE ACCREDITED REPRESENTIVE TO
THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION.

1. The Permanent Mandates Commission are aware of the
circumstances in which a Special Commission, under the Chairman-
ship of Sir Walter Shaw, was appointed by the British Government
in September last, “to enquire into the immediate causes which led
to the recent outbreak in Palestine and make recommendations as
to the steps necessary to avoid a recurrence.” Alter an exhaustive
investigation conducted on the spot, the Commission presented its
report on March 12th, 1930. The report was published in Great
Britain as a Perliamentary Paper at the beginning of April, and
copies were at the same time forwarded to the Secretary-General of
the League of Nations for distribution to members of the Permanent
Mandates Commission

(2) Following upon the publication of the report, the Prime
Minister of Great Britain made a statement in the following terms
in the British House of Commons on April 3rd, 1930:

“His Majesty’s Government will continue to administer
Palestine in accordance with the terms of the mandate as approved
by the Council of the League of Nations. That is an international
obligation from which there can be no question of receding.

“Under the terms of the mandate, His Majesty’s Government
are responsible for promoting ‘the establishment in Palestine of a
National Home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that
nothing shall be done which might prejudice the civil and religious
rights of existing non- Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country’.

“A double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the
one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other ;
and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty’s Government to give effect,
in equal measure, to both parts of the declaration, and to do equal
justice to all sections of the populations of Palestine. That is a
duty from which they will not shrink, and to the discharge of which
they will apply all the resources at their command.

“The report of the Shaw Commission, which is in the hands
of Honourable Members, covers a wide field. The Commfesion was
appointed to consider the immediate causes of the deplorable distur-
bances of August last, and to suggest means of preventing a
recurrence. In endeavouring faithfully to carry out the terms of
reference, the Commission must have found it difficult to draw lines
very reigidly. The Government is now studying the various

44

recommendatiom of the Commission, with a view to dealing with the
immediate causes of the outbreak and to preventingg a recurrence,
and is in consultation with the interests concerned.

‘‘I wish it to be understood that this statement includes the
immediate provision of the forces required to secure civil peace under
existing circumstances.’’

3. His Majesty’s Government have now given further
consideration to the various conclusions and recommendations of the
Oommision of Enquiry. But, before proceeding to the discussion
of details, they would wish to offer some preliminary observations of
a more general nature. The difficulties arising out of the peculiar
character of the Palesthie Mandate are well known. Tliere is no
need to labour this aspect of the question, since it is one with which
the Permanent Mandates Commission are already familiar. It was
discussed in detail in the course of the observations recorded by the
Commission (in November 1924) on the first report on the adminis-
tration of Palestine that came under their examination. The
Commission then remarked that, whereas all the other mandates the
application of which they had hitherto examined were only intended
to give ejSfect to the general principles of Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations, the mandate for Palestine was ‘‘of a more
complex nature”, in that it imposed upon the mandatory Power a
“two-fold duty’\ viz, that of promoting the establishment of a
National Home for the Jewish people, in addition to that of
administering the country in conformity with the interests of the
population as a whole. The result, as the Commission i^ointed out,
was to create a “conflict of interests” between which the balance
had to be held. The observations recorded by the Permanent
Mandates Commission in November 1924 have lo>st none of their
relevance at the present time. The conflict of interest remains, and
the task of holding the balance has certainly not decreased in
difficulty. The situation is one of great delicacy, calling for the
exercise of all possible patience and circumspection. That it has
certain unsatisfactory features, as is pointed out in the Report of the
Commission of Enquirq, His Majesty’s Government are not concerned
to dispute. Rather, they are more concerned to pronde a remedy;
and to this task they mean to address themselves with all the
resources at their disposal. They do not underrate the difficulties.
The conditions under which remedial measures can be applied are
strictly limited; they are governed by the terms of the mandate
and by the dual obligation which it imposes. Such measures cannot
be devided or introduced at a moment’s notice. Caution is essential,
and the ground must be carefully examined before an advance can
safely be made. For these reasons, His Majesty’s Government are
not in a position to formulate precise and concrete proposals in
“regard to all the points that the Commission have raised. On some
at le^t of these points they can do no more than indicate provisionally
the lines on which they hope to proceed.

4. Turning to questions of detail, His Majesty’s Government
accept generally the findings of the Commission of Enquiry under
the following five heads, viz. ;

45

(i) Nature of the outbreak (page 158) ;

(ii) Zionist complaints against the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem

(pages 158 and 159) ;

(iii) Zionist complaints against the Palestine Arab Executive

(page 159) j

(iv) Zionist complaints against the Government (pages 169
to 161) ; and

(v) Minor Arab grievances (page 163).

His Majesty ’s Government do not consider that these conclusions
in themselves call for special action on their part. It will be noted,
in connection with (ii), that Mr. Snell, one of the three Commis-
sioners, in his ‘‘Note of Reservations'', has attributed to the Grand
Mufti a greater share in the responsibility for disturbances than is
attributed to him in the report, and has expressed the view that the
Mufti must bear the blame for his failure to make any effort to
control the character of an agitation conducted in the name of a
religion, of which, in Palestine, he was the head (page 172). As to
this, reference is invited to the statement made on page 77 of the
Commission's report to the effect that, whatever activities he may
have indulged in outside the knowledge of the Government, in public
the Mufti, both at noon on August 23rd and thereafter throughout
the period of the disturbances, exerted his influence in the direction
of promoting peace and restoring order. On this point, the report
states, there was an absolute unanimity of opinion amongg the many
official witnesses with whom the question of the Mufti’s conduct was
raised during the course of the Commission’s enquiry. Mr. Snell
also dissents from the conclusions in the report “acquitting the
Moslem religious authorities of all but the slightest blame for the
innovations introduced in the neighbourhood of the .Wailing Wall".
On this point it is to be observed that the report (paragraph 7 on
page 159) does not purport to assign any specific degree of blame
to the Mohammedan authorities. The conclusion which it records
is that “in the matter of innovations of practice, little blame can
be attached to the Mufti in which some Jewish religious authorities
also would not have to share " His Majesty's Government do not
feel that they can usefully offer any further comments on this branch
of the question.

5. It may be convenient to deal in one paragraph with two
important economic questions which are closely interrelated, viz.,
those concerning immigration and the land problem. The conclusions
and recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry on these
question appear on pages 161, 162, 165 and 166 of their report.
Mr, Snell has also expressed certain views and has made supple-
mentary recommendations with regard to these questions in his
“Note of Reservation." It is in relation to these questions, and to
that of immigration in particular, that the dual character of the
mandate assumes its most significant aspect. This was recognised,
in effect, by the Permanent Mandates Commission when, in the
course of the Observations of November 1924, from which quotation
has already been made, they selected the problem of immigration

46

("perhaps the dominent issue of the present situation in Palestine”)
as best illustrating their general exposition upon the operation of
the mandate. The following passage from the observations states
the problem so clearly that it may be quoted in full:

"It is obvious that, if the mandatory Power had only
to take into consideration the interests of the population, its
immigration policy ought to be dictated primarily by
considerations of the economic needs of the country. It is,
moreover, equally clear that, if the mandatory Power had not
to take into account the interests of the Arab population,
and if its sole duty was to encourage Jewish immigration in
Palestine, it might be in a position to pursue an agrarian
policy which would facilitate and expedite to a greater extent
than its present policy the creation of a Jewish National
Home.”

That, stated succinctly, is the dilemma which has confronted,
and still confronts, the mandatory Government. The policy which
they have adopted, and which they had endeavoured to follow, is
based upon the principle that immigration shall " not exceed the
economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. ’ ’

The soundness of this principle will hardly be challenged, but
its practical application is not without difficulty. The absorptive
capacity of the country must be correctly guaged; everything turns
upon that. But, to guage it correctly, many intricate considerations
of laud settlement, development, etc., must be taken into account;
and the margin for miscalculation is necessarily wide. If there have
been mistakes in the past, they must be avoided in future. But the
question is too important, and too vital to the prosperity of Palestine,
to be tackled hastily or without due consideration. His Majesty’s
Government have felt unable to formulate specific proposals without
f^rrther expert examination of the whole problem in ail its aspects.
A highly qualified investigator has accordingly been appointed to
^oceed to Palestine on a temporary mission, in order to confer with
the High Commissioner and report to His Majesty’s Government on
land settlement, immigration, and development. For this
bir John Hope Simpson, who is employed under the League of
Nations as Vice-Chairman of the Eefugee Settlement Commission in
Greece, has been selected. He is now on his way to Palestine The
whole question of future policy in regard to immigration, land settle-
ment and d^elopment will be considered and determined on receipt
Simpson’s report. In the meantime, temporal
measures are bemg taken with a view to safeguarding the nosition
of certain elements in the population of Palestine. The question of
a temporary suspension of immigration is under examination aM
legislation is to be introduced with the objec? o?SrolW tte
^position of agricultural lands in such m^er L to prevSit the

47

6. His Majesty’s Government are also making enquiries with
regard to the statement on page 161 of the report (paragraph SO)
that the selection of immigrants under the labour schedule ought
to be entrusted to the General Federation of Jewish Labour in
Palestine. They are, further, in consultation with the High
Commissioner for Palestine regarding the question, referred to at
(c) on page 166 of the Commission’s report, of providing credit
facilities for Palestinian agriculturists.

7. On the important subject of constitutional development, the
Commission of Enquiry have made no formal recommendation, beyond
urging that, when the question again comes under review, regard
should be had to their conclusion that the absence of any measure
of self-government greatly aggravated the difficulties of the local
administration. This is a question in which the Permanent Mandates
Commission have from the first displayed an active interest. In
their original observations of November 1924, they expressed their
appreciation of ‘‘the persistent efforts of the High Commissioner to
secure the co-operation of the Arab majority in the central
administration of the country.” A year later, in October 1925, they
expressed the hope that “an extension of co-operation, particularly
in the conduct of municipal and district' affairs”, might become
possible in the near future. Further references to the subject
appeared in the Commission’s “Observations” both of June 1926
and of July 1927. The position, stated quite briefly, is as follows:
The questions of “self-governing institutions” and of “local
autonomy” are dealt with in Articles 2 and 3 respectively of the
Palestine Mandate. Article 2 makes the Mandatory responsible for
placing the country under such political, administrative and
economical conditions as will secure (inter alia) “the development of
self-governing institutions.” Article 3 required the Mandatory, so
far as circumstances permit, to encourage local autonomy. The steps
taken ^ for the establishment of municipal and local councils in
Palestine are well known to the Commission. Nor is it necessary
to refer in detail to the attempts that have been made in the past
to introduce a measure of self-government for the country as a whole.
These attemps are fully described in the report of the Commission
of Enquiry. It will be apparent that the absence of any such
measure of self-government in Palestine is not due to any lack of
goodwill on the part of the mandatory Power. It must be a primary
condition of any constitutional change in Palestine that the mandatory
Government should reserve to itself the power of carrying out the
obligations imposed upon it by the mandate. The question formed
the subject of conversation with the delegation of Palestinian Arabs
which lately came to England for the purpose of representing their
views on future policy in Palestine. It has been made clear to the
delegation that no measure of self-government could be considered
which was not compatible with the requirements of the mandate.
The matter is, of course, one which also deeply concerns the Jewish
Agency.

8. On page 163 of the report, the Commission expressed certain
views on the difficulties inherent in the mandate. Their recommen-
dations on this point, as recorded on pages 164 and 165, include the
issue of a clear statement of policy;

48

(1) Containing a definition in clear and positive terms of
the meaning which His Majesty’ Government attach to the passages
in the mandate for the safeguarding of the rights of the non-Jevish
eommiinity in Palestine, and

(2) Laying down, for the guidance of the Government of
Palestine, directions more explicit than any that have yet been given
as to the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land and
immigration.

The statement of British policy in Palestine, of which a copy
is reproduced on pages 196 to 199 of the report of the Commission,
was issued in 1922. T!ie administration of the country has since
been conducted on the general lines laid down in that statement,
except that, for reasons already explained, the proposed Legislative
Council has never been brought into being, His Majesty’s Govern-
ment do not challenge the view that a further and more explicit
statement of policy is required; and it is their intention in due
course to issue such a statement. Since, however, no such statement
could be adequate or complete which ignored the vital <|uestions of
land settlement, immigration and development, it will be necessary
to await the report of Sir J. Hope Simpson before giving effect to
the Commission’s recommendation. Their further recommendations
relating to the functions of the Zionist Organisation and to the
Palestine Zionist Executive (page 167 of the report) will also be
adopted when the proposed statement is drawn up

9. As regards defence and security, the Commission, on
page 163 of their report, have expressed the view that the policy of
reducing the garrison in Palestine and Trans- Jordan was carried too
far. In this connection, the remarks made on page 157 of the report
should be borne in mind. As is there admitted, the presence of
troops or of British police in larger numbers on August 23rd, 1929,
would not necessarily have prevented an outbreak. The experience
of April 1920 and May 1921, when racial disturbances occurred —
despite the strength of the garrison — points the other way. His
Majesty’s Government have at present under their earnest considera-
tion the question of the composition and strength of the garrison to
be retained in Palestine in the future. In the meantime, they do
not propose to disturb the existing garrison of two battalions of
infantry plus units of the Royal Air Force. Arrangements have
also been made with a view of ensuring the despatch of reinforce-
ments to Palestine with the least possible delay if need should arise.
As regard the police, effect has already been given to recommenda-
tion (o) on page 168 of the Commission’s report, that an independent
enquiry should he made by an experienced police ofiScer from some
other dependency into the organisation of the Department of Police
in Palestine. The ofi&cer selected for this enquiry, Mr. H. L. Dow-
biggin,^ Inspector of Police, Ceylon, arrived in Palestine in January,
and^ his final report is expected shortly. In the meantime, an
additional 400 British police have ben recruited for Palestine and
steps have been taken to increase the mobility of the British police.
Mr. Dowbiggm has presented an ad interim report on the specific
sub 3 ect of the protection of outlying Jewish colonies; and action is
being taken on the lines recommended by him, A further increase

49

in the number of British and Palestine police is involved, and a
scheme of defence, including the establishment and control of sealed
armouries, is being brought into force. His Majesty’s Government
are fully satisfied as to the need for sealed armouries j without them,
the adequate defence of the colonies ,can be ensured only at a
prohibitive cost. The question of improving the intelligence service
and of forming a reserve of special constables, which formed the
subject of the recommendations in paragraph 53 on page 167 and
paragraph 55 (d) on page 168, are being taken up with the High
Commissioner for Palestine

10. With regard to the recommendation in paragraph 50 on
page 166, the Permanent Mandates Commission are no doubt aware
that the Council of the League have approved of the appointment
of a Commission to define and determine Jewish and Moslem rites at
the western or Wailing Wall

11. There remain the recommendations in paragraph 52 on
page 167 under the heading “Press Incitement”. The High
Commissioner has at present under consideration the enactment of
legislation to provide for the better control of the Press. The
suggestion made in paragraph 52 (h) will be duly considered in this
connection. The High Commissioner’s attention will also be drawn
to the remarks on Press incitement included in the “Note of
Reservations’’ by Mr Snell (page 181).

May 1930.

50

Appendix (J)

SPEECH BY GENERAL NURl as-SA’ID AT THE
PALESTINE CONFERENCE

February 13, 3939.

H.B. General NURI as-Sa’id: Mr. MacDonald, Your Royal
Highnesses, Your Excellencies and Gentlemen, this Conference has
been summoned at this juncture in view of the present tragic situation
in Palestine. The British Government, in order to find a solution,
has decided to consult all Arab States, and we representatives of
Arab States cannot but be grateful to Great Britain for recognising
that we are equally interested with her in finding a way to settle
the Palestine impasse.

But I cannot help feeling that it is most unfortunate that this
Conference has to be held at a time w'hen the Jews of Europe are
suffering such unparalleled misfortune. When Ehgland, Holland,
Prance and America are endeavouring to find places of refuge for
the unfortunate Jews who are being expelled from European countries
it is particularly unfortunate that the Arabs should have to resist
their further entry into Palestine. Ever since the Arabs became an
Empire and a ruling race the Jews have been guaranteed protection
within their dominions. When Christendom rejected the Jews
sheltered them. It is exceedingly unfortunate that at this miserable
period in Jewish history the Arabs, of all people, should appear to
be intolerant.

As a representative of a State in which Jews are equal citizens
with Arabs I do not want the present unfortunate state of the Jews
in Europe to be used as a reason for denying jimtice to the Arabs,
who have never in all their history been intolerant towards the Jews.

The interest which the Government of Iraq takes in the settle-
ment of the present dispute in Palestine is very real and lively.
Not only is she_ a close neighbour of Palestine but until the post-war
policy was initiated in that country the composition of her popula-
tmn was not dissimilar. Both countries are predominantly Arab in
character ^d both contain large Jewish communities. Both formed
part of the pre-war Ottoman Empire and were governed by the
sme laws. Their culture, customs and local institutions are almost
Identic^. So I must preface my remarks with some observations on
the position of the Jews in the pre-war Ottoman Empire and in Iraq
up to the present day. Throughout the Ottoman Empire were

eslmaM at 800.000 in 1912. They were mostly centred in a!
towns but a few apicultural communities did exist. Many of the
i^uni les were large ones, that in Iraq ammounting to 70,000
These Jews were oi^amsed as a community (millet), and were race

puiiLy, inougn tne Zionist movement exister^ hpfnva

Enrepe. we in the Ottoman Empire, thonTSar^rfi

51

regarded it as a spiritual symbolic mo^'ement quite unassooiated with
politics. There was certainly no movement of Jews from within the
Ottoman Empire to Palestine. The Jews were very contented,
prosperous subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and happy to remain
in the various provinces which had sheltered them for centuries.
Ottoman Jews had no sympathy with Zionism and such migration as
did take place was to such centres as Bombay, Calcutta, Shanghai
and London, in all of which places Jews from Baghdad and other
parts of the Ottoman Empire established large and prosperous
business houses. No Jews from Iraq or other parts of the Ottoman
Empire ever went to Palestine to settle. Palestine was not regarded
by ^e Jews in other parts of the Ottoman Empire as a particularly
desirable place in which to settle or a land to which they must return.

The Jews, moreover, identified themselves very much with the
life of the district in which they lived. For example, those in Iraq
would consider themselves Iraqi Jews and as much concerned with
the life of the Arabs who surrounded them, and with whom they had
daily contacts, as with Jewry in other parts of the Ottoman Empire.

As far as Iraqi Jews are concerned the situation has continued
very much the same since the close of the Great War. Iraq has
nearly 100,000 Jews, half of them in Baghdad itself. They are
a wealthy and contented community who play a very great part in
the commercial life of Iraq. A large number are Government officials ;
and certain departments, such as finance, railways and the Port of
Basrah, are very largely staffed by them. Under Iraq law they are
equal citizeM with Mohammedans and Christians, although they
retain the right to have their own religious courts for some matters
of personal status. This is in accordance with tx’aditional Arab
practice, which has always been tolerant. Good relations between
Jews and Arabs have existed foi’ centuries in Iraq, and have only
become changed, unfortunately, in the last few years. The main-
tenance of these good relations is the anxious concern of the Iraqi
Government.

But the growth of Zionism and the Zionist policy pursued in
Palestine have from time to time aroused feelings which have
threatened to affect these good relations between the Arabs and Jews
111 JLrd.(^.

♦T, changed feeling was shown when

the late Lord Melchett, then Sir Alfred Mond, visited Baghdad. But
even then there was no feeling exhibited against the Jews^ as Jews —
only a real hostility to political Zionism.

Some years ago the Iraqis learnt with considerable surprise that
Sir Henry Dobbs, when High Commissioner for Iraq, had nSumablv

of England, summoned the leading Jews

of Sa^gMad and asked them to accept a branch of the Jewish Agenev
m Baghdad. As this was a Zionist body the Iraqi Jews absoEJ
refund to be associated with such a branch, and eventually convinced
Sir Henry Dobbs that the Agency could not possibly be^allowS to
be estabhshed m Baghdad. This official effort to toree IraST Jews
to become Zionists only became known to the Iraqi authoritii soZ

52

years later. The important point to note is that the Jews of Iraq
did not want to be associated with Zionism. To-day, as Prime
Minister of Iraq, I can confidently assert that I come here not only
to represent the xVrabs of Ira{i but equally the Jews of Iraq, whose
interests are identical with those of the Arabs

In 1929, following the Wailing Wall disturbances in Palestine,
attempts were made by Arab sympathisers in Baghdad to hold
demonstrations. The Iraq Government broke up these demonstra-
tions by force and the friendly relations between Jews and Arabs
continued to all outward appearance But there was a growing
feeling that events in Palestine were alfeeting public opinion in
Iraq. Prom that time onwards a greater interest was evinced by
Iraqis in Palestine affairs.

In the last few years the position has unfortunately deteriorated
considerably. The repres.sive policy adopted in Palestine, the
throwing of bombs by Jews in Haifa and Jerusalem and the disorders
and open rebellion in Palestine that followed, have roused Arab senti-
ment in Iraq. Fortunately there have been no serious attacks on
Jews. It is true that a few* bombs have been throwna in the Jewish
quarter and in Jewish clubs in Baghdad, but there has been no loss
of life. Tiie Iraq Government will, of course, not tolerate any form
of pogrom.

But the situation in Palestine has caused repercussions in Iraq
which are a source of great anxiety to the Government, which finds
that the traditional harmonious relations betw^een its Jewish and
Arab subjects are being violently disturbed by policies and actions
occurring outside the frontiers of Iraq and not under the control of
the Iraq Government or of the Iraq Jews or the Iraq Arabs.

If there is no immediate settlement of the Palestine problem, we
fear that the ill-feeling which now exists between Jews and Arabs in
Palestine will spread into Iraq and become a menace to the peace of
the country. It will seriously affect the prosperity of the Iratji Jews
and embarrass the Iraqi Government, which is very jealous of its
reputation for toleration and justice to all classes and sects. IShould
such a situation occur in Iraq as has occurred in Palestine, with Jews
and Arabs attacking each other, it will be a tragedy, as both the Iraqi
Jews and the Iraqi Arabs are completely innocent in the matter,
having originally no quarrel whatsoever. Are they to be the victims
of Zionist policy pursued elsewhere?

That this apprehension of the Iraq Government is not without
foundation is proved by events in Syria. I regret that, for reasons
into which I need not enter, Syria is not represented at this Confer-
ence. But the sentiments of the Arabs of Syria are fortunately wide-
ly known, and in any ease as Arabs they must feel as their fellow
Arabs do throughout the Middle East. Though they are absent in the
flesh, their spirit still animates us. In 1925 the late Lord Balfour
visited Damascus. Large demonstrations protesting against the British
policy in Palestine took place in Damascus and Beyrouth, shops were
closed a day of mourning proclaimed. Since that date, every
year, there have been similar mass demonstrations in all the cities of
byna and the. Lebanon, the last taking place in November^ 1938.

53

These demonstrations have taken place although Syria and the
Lebanon are under the control of the French Government. They
have served to keep alive ill-feeling against the Jews. We in Iraq
have not allowed anti- Jewish demonstrations; we have done every-
thing in our power to allay the growing resentment of Iraqi Arabs
against the Jews. We cannot, however, say what the future will
bring.

From the foregoing it will be appreciated that the Government
of Iraq is compelled to take a lively interest in the Palestine situation,
as it afects so closely the maintenance of law and order in Iraq itself.

As the Palestinian question is judged in Iraq there are, however,
other pertinent points to be kept in mind. Iraq cannot forget the
promises made to King Hussein by Sir Henry McMahon. These
promises were made on behalf of the British Government in the
course of the Great War, and have not been repudiated by Great
Britain. The letters signed by Sir Henry McMahon were in Arabic
and their meaning is perfectly clear. Prom the Arabic text it is
evident that Palestine was included in the area that was promised to
the Arabs.

These promises were made to King Hussein and the Arabs in
Arabic alone, and therefore the Arabic text must be the dominating
text. On the strength of these promises made in Arabic by Sir
Henry McMahon on behalf of Great Britain, King Hussein and his
sons, with the aid of the British, commenced not only armed hositili-
ties against the Turks but a sustained propaganda among the Arabs
of Syria and Palestine and promised them that Palestine would form
part of the future Arab State. These promises of King Hussein to
the Arabs of Palestine were made with the full knowledge of the
British Higher Command, who in fact arranged for the pamphlets
to be distributed by aeroplane in Palestine. The pamphlet, moreover,
contained an assurance that they were issued with the authority of
General Allenby.

Great Britain has stated that as one of the parties to the corres-
pondence she must be the interpreter of what she intended in the
correspondence. Mr. MacDonald in the Conference on Saturday
stated that Palestine had always been regarded by Great Britain as
excluded from the area of the Arab countries whose independence
Great Britain would acknowledge. He further said that Sir Henry
McMahon had himself declared that he also had never intended to
include Palestine in that area.

But in the vital letter which Sir Henry McMahon wrote to King
Hussein on October 24th, 1915, he expressly stated that he had re-
ferred the matter of boundaries to the Government of Great Britain
and that on behalf of that Government he was communicating the
statement regarding boundaries which the letter contained. There-
fore the opinion of Sir Henry McMahon twenty-two years later has
no legal or other value, as he was merely the medium of communica-
tion adopted by the British Government.

54

When, there is a dispute between two parties over the interpre-
tation of a document the principle of interpretation adopted in the
conrts is to take the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words used in the document. If these are clear the intentions of the
parties are not considered unless there is strong proof that a word
or phrase was used by both parties in some special sense agreed upon
by both, or at any rate known to both.

An examination of the words employed in this crucial letter of
Sir Henry McMahon makes it clear that Palestine was not excluded.
The other letters all bear this out. As the Palestine Delegation have
prepared a detailed statement on this point with the full legal argu-
ment, there is no need for me to say more here.

TCiTig Hussein and the Arabs entered the war on the side of tht
Allies, relying on the definite promises of the British Government to
acknowledge an independent Arab State which would include Pales-
tine. They recognised that Great Britain had made reservations in
respect of Beyrouth and the Lebanon, but King Hussein made it clear
in his letters to Sir Henry McMahon that, while for the moment, in
order not to embarrass Great Britain in her relations with France,
the Arabs would not create difficulties, yet at the conclusion of the
war they would claim even Beyrouth and the northern coastal regions
from Great Britain.

Throughout the operations that followed, with the close co-
operation that existed between British military and political officers
and the Arab leaders, these promises were frequently discussed, both
formally and informally. It was never suggested that Palestine
should be excluded. Indeed, the contrary was the case. British
officers attached to the Shereefian forces and the officers of Lord
AUenby’s staff with whom the Arabs came in contact aU acted on the
assumptio'i that Palestine was to be part of the future Arab State.

All Arab representatives from 1918 to the present day have
never ceased to claim from Great Britain the carrying out of the
specific pledge made by Sir Henry McMahom. King Feisal seized
every opportunity to press upon the British Government the satisfac-
tion of the claim of the Palestinian Arabs for inclusion in an Arab
State.

In 1919 I was with the Emir Feisal in London when he took up
this matter vigorously with the late Lord Curzon in the presence of
■Sir Hurbert Young, who is now in England and available for consul-
tation. The Emir Feisal claimed the fulfilment of the promises
made by Great Britain to his father and specifically claimed the in-
clusion of Palestine in the Arab State. In view of the Amir’s insistence
that the McMahon correspondence included Palestine Lord Curzon
had the original correspondence brought from Cairo to be examined.
The result of this examination was not communicated to us, but we
felt that there must have been discovered some discrepancy between
the Arabic and English texts to account for Lord Curzon ’s silence.
But we Arabs cannot be held responsible for any such discrepancy.
The British undertakings to us must be examined in the light of the
text in which they were made to us, that is to say the -Arabic text.

m

We ask the British Government to go into this matter of the
exact promises made to King Hnssein and the Arabs in the Arabic
letters sent by the British Government through Sir Henry McMahon.
We do not ask for the publication of the English documents, as we
have never seen them and did not rely upon them. So the difficulty
mentioned by Mr. MacDonald at Saturday's meeting about the publi-
cation of secret State documents does not really arise, as the Arabic
documents upon which we rely have already been made public.

Why was this explicit promise not carried out? The reason, as
far as we can see, is the existence of the Balfour Declaration of 1917.
In this Declaration it was stated: ‘‘His Majesty ^s Government view
with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for
the J ewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and poli-
tical status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”.

This is the only promise made to the Jews by Great Britain that
we are aware of. It was made without consulting King Hussein or
any of the Arab leaders. It cannot therefore be regarded as in any
way binding the Arabs. In our view it is not an undertaking which
should be allowed to obstruct or delay the fulfilment of the prior
pledges made to the Arabs, but from the very moment of its
publication it has in fact affected the interpretation of the undertak-
ing given to the Arabs by Great Britain in 1915.

In 1916 Arab officers and men who had served in the Turkish
Army volunteered for service in the forces of King Hussein reiving
on the promises made by Great Britain in th the McMahon correspon-
dence to create an Arab State which would include Palestine. The
regular contingents of trained troops were almost entirely composed
of Palestinians Syrians and Iraqis, and they bore the brunt of the
ngnting.

men Tre in this Army heard of the Balfour Declaration at the
Actaba, and the news caused consternation
throughhout the whole of the Arab force. We took counsel together
and declared that we must abandon the fight for Arab indeuendence
m oo-operation with the forces of Great Britain until 4 received
assurances that the McMahon pledges would be carried out. ITiug
Hussein had already potested against the Balfour Declaration and
m January 1918 received from Commander Hogarth of the Arab
^reau, who had been sent by His Ma.iesty’s Government to Jedda

Balfour Declaration would not conflict
political and economic freedom promised to the Arabs in the
McMohan correspondence. He was further assured by His Maiestv’s
^vemment trough Colander Hograth that the Balfour Declafa-
S ^ restricted settlement of Jews in Pal2-

raltural reasons, and that no Jewish State was
Hussein commimieated these assurances to the
tte sSSr ^ ^omeq^enee continued to fight side by side with

56

A similar Declaration was made to Arab leaders in Cairo in Jnne
1918 in an oflScial statement issued on the antliority of the Foreign
Office and known as '"the Declaration to the Seven''. In this state-
ment His Majesty's Government promised that the future government
of Palestine would be based upon the principle ‘‘of the consent of the
governed." ^

In view of these explanations the Arabs for the remainder of
the war prosecuted their campaign against the Turks, confident that
at the conclusion of hostilities Palestine would be a part of the Arab
State. Haji Amin al Husseini, the present Grand Mufti, actively
recruited volunteers in Palestine from among the Arabs to join the
forces of King Peisal. He openly promised them that Palestine
would be part of the Arab State, and these promises were known to
the British Officers, who actively assisted him in his efforts to recruit
Palestinian Arabs. All the British officers with whom the Arabs
fighting in the Hejaz, Palestine and Syria came in contact shared
their views, and though Zionist propaganda in Europe and America
was, as we now know, giving a totally different interpretation of the
Balfour Declaration, the Arabs were encouraged by Great Britain to
believe that Palestine would in future enjoy self-government as part
of the Arab State. The Anglo-French Declaration of November
1918 did nothing to disabuse them of this belief. After the
Armistice, when Zionist aspirations became known, Arab alarm was
revived. The Arab leaders themselves were fully employed consoli-
dating the positions captured in Syria against any possible recurrence
of the war and in creating an Arab State in Syria. They were con-
tent to leave the administration of Palestine temporarily in the hands
of their Allies, the British, whom they still trusted to carry out their
promises in respect to Palestine when peace should be finally declared.

At the Peace conference, however, they discovered for the first
time that the British Government were prepared to give the Jews a
far different “National Home" in Palestine than the British Govern-
ment had explained to the Arabs. This led to the conversations bet-
ween the late King Peisal and Lord Curzon in 1919 to which I have
already referred. That this Arab view of the meaning attached to
the Balfour Declaration at the time it was made in 1917 is correct, is
confirmed by the “Statement of Policy in Palestine" isued by the
Colonial Office in 1922 which defines “The Jewish National Home"
as “a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on
grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride". The Jews
were to be allowed to establish in Palestine a religious and cultural
centre and not a political state embracing all Palestine and to be
populated by mass immigration of Jews to the eventual exclusion of
all Arabs.

But though the Colonial Office, in 1922, gave this definition of
the National Home, the British Government had in that year accepted
from the League of Nations the Palestinian Mandate, a document
which the British and Zionists had jointly drafted and which con-
templated the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home
of a totally different kind. From 1919 the Arab leaders and the
people of Palestine had viewed with alarm the growing Zionist pre-
tensions. They had protested repeatedly against them but were

57

always told to wait mitil the League of Nations decided what^ the
future of Palestine was to be. When the Mandate was proclaimed
and their worst fears justified they refused all co-operation with Great
Britain, feeling that they had been betrayed. They could not possibly
accept any offer by Great Britain of palliatives such as mock legisla-
tive councils until their basic claims under the McMahon promises
were admitted and accepted by Great Britain without qualification.

In consequence the Arabs have consistently refused to recognise
the Mandate for Palestine. For several years, however, opposition
in Palestine, though active, was not violent, and Great Britain had a
chance to set up self-governing institutions had she so desired. But
the administration of Palestine by Great Britain was not even in
accordance with the Mandate. Article 2 of the Mandate, which is
the most important article, imposes two equal duties upon the Manda-
tory: first, the establishment of the Jewish National Home, and
secondly, the development of self-governing institutions. Other
articles impose other duties, but they are only designed to further
these two objects. One of these secondary duties is that of facilitat-
ing Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and without preju-
dice to the rights and position of other sections of the population.

During the past eighteen years the Mandatory Power has encou-
raged Jewish immigration to the maximum degree possible and in
every manner, natural and artificial Moreover, the Jewish Agency,
the oflSicial body set up to co-operate with the Government on this and
other matters, has admitted conniving at the entry into Palestine of
even those Jews whose entry into Palestine was considered undesirable
and whom the regulations of the Government did not allow to enter.
In addition to encouraging Jewish immigration, the Government of
Palestine has faithfully carried out the obligations to secure the
establishment of the Jewish Nation Home. Hebrew has become an
official language and large numbers of foreign Jews with no Pales-
tinian status have been employed in the Government services. Zionist
bodies have been allowed to acquire large tracts of land and to control
the sources of minerals and of electric power, no option being allowed
either to Arabs or the Palestine administration to share in the re-
sources of their country.

As a result, during the past eighteen years over 300,000 Jews
have migrated to Palestine — ^that small country. We want to know
when, if ever, this immigration will cease. Do the British promises
to the Jews entail a continuous, never-ending stream of Jewish immig-
rants into Palestine'? At what date will the promises made to the
Jews in the Balfour Declaration come to an end? Jewish immigration
according to the Mandate, should be conditioned by the rights and
position of other sections of the population of Palestine. According
to the reports of the Shaw Commission, and the Hope-Simpson In-
quiry, the economic capacity of Palestine to absorb further immig-
rants came to an end in 1930

But nothing has been done to further the second objective laid
down in Article 2 of the Mandate— the development of self-governing
institutions. The Palestinian Arabs have not been given any share
in the government of their own country. No institutions have been

58

set up to prepare them for self-government. They are farther from
the ideal of self-government now than they were in 1920. For
eighteen years they have been ruled by a peculiar combination of
Crown Colony Government and Zionism co-operating very closely, to
the total exclusion of Arabs. All this has gone on notwithstanding
the fact that in the Passfield White Paper it was declared: ^^It is the
considered opinion of His Majesty’s Government that the time has
now come when the important question of the establishment of a
measure of self-government in Palestine must, in the interest of the
community as a whole, be taken in hand without further delay.”
The Passfield White Paper set's forth the advantages to be gained by
the development of self-governing institutions, but the Zionists were
hostile to any effort on the part of the Mandatory Power to carry out
this duty of promoting self-governing institutions in spite of the fact
that this duty was laid down in Article 2 of the Mandate and was of
equal importance with that of creating a Jewish National Home.
Zionist policy was naturally animated by a desire to delay the promo-
tion of self-governing institutions in Palestine until the day when, by
intensive mass immigration of Jews, they had established in Palestine
sufficient Jews to outnumber the Arabs.

In 1930, following the reports of the Shaw Commission and the
Hope-Simpson Inquiry, Lord Passfield, then Colonial Secretary,
issued a White Paper in which he accepted many of the Arab claims
and proposed what amounted to a new policy in Palestine. Though
it did not meet all the Arab demands it roused their hopes that a new
era would open in Palestine. Unfortunately, Zionist agitation and
political pressure in England compelled the Prime Minister to
give public assurances to the Zioist leader. Dr. Weiszmann, that
British policy in Palestine would not be radically changed. This
letter to Dr. Weiszmann of February 1931, though laid before the
House of Commons, has not the status of a Command Paper, and the
late Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was particularly anxious that the letter
should not have the same status as the dominating document — ^the
Passfield White Paper. But in the result British policy in Palestine
continued unchanged, and in consequence the Arabs have been com-
pelled to regard this letter as the ruling declaration of British policy.

Since that date the Arabs of P'alestine have been in despair.
Convinced that no report of any Commission that was favourable to
the Arab claims would be acted upon by Great Britain, the Arabs of
Palestine felt that it was impossible any longer to work with the
Mandatory Power.

This failure of the Mandatory Ptower to fufil the specific duty
imposed by the Mandate to promote self-governing institutions has,
in the opinion of all Arabs, led to the present breakdown in the admi-
nistration of the country. In the White Paper Lord Passfield assert-
ed that it is a primary duty of the Administration to ensure peace,
order and good government in Palestine. This elementary duty the
Mandatory Power has failed to do. Her policy has alienated the
goodwill of the Arab majority and open rebellion has resulted. The
civil authorities have had to call in the aid of the military and air
forces to hold down the country and the ordinary liberties of the
subjects have been suspended.

We in Iraq, who have been treated by Great Britain in such a
different manner, who were given a large measure of self-government
in 1924, cannot understand why Great Britain will not treat out
brother Arabs in Palestine with equal generosity and equal justice.
We were given the task of maintaining order ourselves, of developmg
the resources of our own country in our own way, and of building
up a new state on modern lines. We ourselves had to create parlia-
mentary institutions, so that eventually, with your constant aid and
assistance, we gained complete independence and recognition as such
from the nations of the world. Nobody will deny that British policy
in Iraq has intensified the good relations which have existed between
Arabs and English for centuries. Iraq has benefited, because there
are many things that can be done by a people governing themselves
which cannot be done for them by any other State, however well
intentioned. British interests have certainly not suffered, because
friendship is the best foundation for all relationships, whether politi-
cal or economic.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we in Iraq feel that the intro-
duction of a similar policy in Palestine, a country so similar to Iraq,
would have the same beneficial effects. We hold that the Palestinians
were promised by the British Government, through Sir Henry
McMahon, the same self-government that has been granted to us in
Iraq, and that the undertaking made to the Arab world in the Anglo-
French agreement of November 1918, that the objects of France and
England were to liberate the peoples and to establish a national
government and administration drawing their authority from the
initiative and free choice of the people was addressed also to the
people of Palestine.

On several occasions during the past year Mr. Chamberlain, the
Prime Minister, has declared that Great Britain is prepared to discuss
any alleged injustice contained in the Peace Treaties and to endeavour
to remedy it by free negotiation and in a spirit of conciliation and
appeasement. Consequently we in Iraq are convinced that he will
not refuse our request for justice in the matter of Palestine, and that
in view of the tragic situation that has prevailed there for the past
two years, he will agree that now is the time to reconsider British
policy for that country.

W(3 are certain that Palestine can only be pacified and a future
peace ensured by the grant to Palestine of self-government.

In all that I have said I beseech you to remember that I speak
as a sincere friend of Great Britain. I am, I think, the only man
here present who, under the command of King Hussein and his sons,
led forces in the field in active co-operation with the forces of Great
Britain during the Great War. I would not willingly say one word
which would wound the feelings of any Briton, as I know’ them to be
at heart my friends. If anything I have said is felt to be too strong,
my excuse is that I feel I must tell you how your policy is regarded
in Arab countries.

In conclusion, and in the spirit of a life-long friend and admirer
of Gre at Britain, I must make it clear that this Conference is being
closely watched by all Arabs and all Muslims throughout the world.
Expectations have been roused by it. It must not fail.

Appendix (K)

1939 White Paper

H. B. M. G’s STATEMENT OF POLICY. ON
PALESTINE 1939.

In the Statement on Palestine, issued on November 9th 1938,
His Majesty’s Government announced their intention to invite repre-
sentatives of the Arabs of Palestine, of certain neighbouring countries
and of the Jewish Agency to confer with them in London regar<^
future policy. It was their sincere hope that, as a result of full, free
and frank discussion, some understanding might be reached. Con-
ferences recently took place with Arab and Jewish delegations, lastmg
for a period of several weeks, pd served the purpose of a complete
exchange of views between British Ministers and the Arab and Jewish
representatives. In the light of the discussions as well as of the
situation in Palestine and of the reports of the Royal Commission
and the Partition Commission, certain proposals were formulated by
His Majesty’s Government and were laid before the Arab and Jewish
delegations as the basis of an agreed settlement. Neither the Arab
nor the Jewish delegations felt able to accept these proposals, and the
conferences therefore did not result in an agreement. Accordingly.
His Majesty’s Government are free to formulate their own pohcy,
and after careful consideration they have decided to adhere generally
to the proposals which were toally submitted to, and discussed with,
the Arab and Jewish delegations.

(2) The mandate for Palestine, the terms of which were con-
firmed by the Council of the League of Nations in 1922, has governed
the policy of successive British Governments for nearly twenty years.
It embodies the Balfour Declaration and imposes on the Mmdatory
four main obligations. These obligations are set out in Articles 2, 6
and 13 of the mandate. There is no dispute regarding the interpre-
tation of one of these obligations, that touching the protection of and
access to the holy places and religious buildings or sites. The other
three main obligations are generally as follows: —

(i) To place the country under such political, administrative

and economic conditions as will secure the establishment
in Palestine of a National home for the Jewish people,
to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable condi-
tions, and to encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish
Agency, close settlement by Jews on the land.

(ii) To safeguard the civil and reli^ous rights of all the in-
habitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion,
and, whilst facilitating Jewish immigration and settle-
ment, to ensure that the rights and position of other
sections of the population are not prejudiced.

61

(iii) To place the country under such political, administrative
and economic conditions as will secure the development
of self-governing institutions.

(3) The Royal Commission and previous Commissions of En-
quiry have drawn attention to the ambiguity of certain expressions
in the mandate, such as the expression ^‘a national home for the
Jewish people*’, and they have found in this ambiguity and the re-
sulting uncertainty as to the objectives of policy a fundamental cause
of unrest and hostility between Arabs and Jews. His Majesty’s
Government are convinced that, in the interests of the peace and
Tvell-being of the whole people of P'alestine, a clear definition of
policy and objectives is essential. The proposal of partition recom-
mended by the Royal Commission would have afforded such clarity,
but the establishment of self-supporting independent Arab and
Jewish States within Palestine has been found to be impracticable.
It has therefore been necessary for His Majesty’s Government to
devise an alternative policy which will, consistently with their
obligations to Arabs and Jews, meet the needs of the situation in
Palestine. Their views and proposals are set forth below under the
three heads, (I) The Constitution, (II) Immigration, and (IH) Land.

L THE CONSTITUTION.

4. It has been urged that the expression **a national home for
the Jewish people” offered a prospect that Palestine might in due
course become a Jewish State or Commonwealth. His Majesty’s
Government do not wish to contest the view, which was expressed
by the Royal Commission, that the Zionist leaders at the time of
the issue of the Balfour Declaration recognised that an ultimate
Jewish State was not precluded by the terms of the Declaration. But,
with the Royal Commission, His Majesty’s Government believe that
the framers of the mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was
embodied could not have intended that Palestine should be converted
into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the
country. That Palestine was not to be converted into a Jewish
State might be held to be implied in the passage from the Command
Paper of 1922 which reads as follows:

‘‘Unauthorised statements have been made to the effect
that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine.
jPhrases have been used such as that ‘Palestine is to become
as Jewish as England is English’, His Majesty’s Govern-
ment regard any such expectation as impracticable and have
no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contem-
plated the disappearance or the subordination of the

Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They
would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the
(Balfour) Declaration referred to do not contemplate that
Palestine as a whole should be converted into a JewifiJi
National Home but that such a Home should be founded in
Palestine.”

62

Bnt this statement has not removed doubts, and His Majesty’s
Government therefore now declare unequivocally that it is not part
of their policy that P'alestine should become a Jewish State. They
would indeed regard it as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs
under the mandate, as well as to the assurances which have been
given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of
Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against
their will.

5. The nature of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was
further described in the Command Paper of 1922 as follows: —

‘^During the last two or three generations, the Jews have
created in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of
whom about one-fourth are farmers or workers upon the land.
This community has its own political organs; an elected
assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected
councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of
its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical
Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business
is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a
Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intel-
lectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This
community, then, with its town and country population, its
political, religious and social organisations, its own language,
its own customs, its own life, has in fact ^national’ charac-
teristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development
of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered
that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the
inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further develop-
ment of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance
of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may
become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may
take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a
pride. But in order that this community should have the
best prospect of free development and provide a full
opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities,
it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as
of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is
necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in
Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it
should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic
connection.”

6. His Majesty’s Government adhere to this interpretation of
the Declaration of 1917 and regard it as an authoritative and
^mprehensive description of the character of the Jewish National
Home in Palestine. It^ envisaged the further development of the
existag Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other parts
of the world. Evidence that His Majesty’s Government have been
carrying out^ their obligation in this respect is to be found in the
statement of 1922 was published, more than
monugrated to Palestine, and that the population
of the National Home has risen to some 450,000, or appwi^g a

63

third of the entire population of the country. Nor has the Jewish
community failed to take advantage of the opportunities given to it.
The growth of the Jewish National Home and its achievements im
many fields are a remarkable constructive effort which must command
the admiration of the world and must be, in particular, a source of
pride to the Jewish people.

7. In the recent discussions, the Arab delegations have repeated
the contention that Palestine was included with the area in which
Sir Henry McMahon, on behalf of the British Government, in
October 1915, undertook to recognise and support Arab independence.
The validity of this claim, based on the terms of the correspondence
which passed between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca,
was thoroughly and carefully investigated by British and Arab
representatives during the recent conferences in London. Their
report, which has been published, states that both the Arab and the
British representatives endeavoured to understand the point of view
of the other party, but that they were unable to reach agreement
upon an interpretation of the correspondence. There is no need to
summarise here the arguments presented by each side. His Majesty
Government regret the misunderstandings which have arisen as
regards some of the phrases used. For their part, they can only
adhere, for the reasons given by their representatives in the report,
to the view that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was excluded
from Sir Henry McMahon’s pledge, and they therefore cannot agree
that the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for a claim that
Palestine should be converted into an Arab State.

8. His Majesty’s Government are charged as the mandatory
authority ^‘to secure the development of self-governing institutions”
in Palestine. Apart from this specific obligation, they would regard
it as contrary to the whole spirit of the mandate system that the
population of Palestine should remain for ever under mandatory
tutelage. It is proper that the people of the country should as early
as possible enjoy the rights of self-government which are exercised by
the people of neighbouring countries. His Majesty’s Government
are unable at present to foresee the exact constitutional forms which
the government in Palestine will eventually take, but their objective is
self-government, and they desire to see established ultimately an
independent Palestine State. It should be a State in which the two
peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government
in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.

9. ^ The establishment of an independent State and the complete
relinquishment of mandatory control in Palestine would require such
relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good
government possible. Moreover, the growth of self-governing institu-
tions in Palestine, as in other countries, must be an evolutionary
process. A transitional period will be required before independence
is achieved, throughout which ultimate responsibility for the Govern-
ment of the country will be retained by His Majesty’s Government
as the mandatory authority, while the people of the country are taking
an increasing share in the Government, and understanding and
co-operation amongst them are growing. It will be the constant
endeavour of His Majesty’s Government to promote good relations
between the Arabs and the Jews.

64

10. In the light of these considerations His Majesty Govern-
ment make the following declaration of their intentions regarding the
future government of Palestine :

(1) The objective of His Majesty Government is the
establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in
such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide
satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both
countries in the future. This proposal for the establishment of the
independent State would involve consultatioii with the Council of the
League of Nations with a view to the termination of the mandate.

(2) The independent State .should be one in which Arabs
and Jews share in government in such a way as to ensure that the
essential interests of each community are .safeguarded.

(3) The establishment of the independent State will be
preceded by a trauvsitional period throughout which His Majesty’s
Government will retain responsibility for the government of the
countrj. During the transitional period, the people of Palestine will
be given an increasing part in the government of their country. Both
sections of the population will have an opportunity to participate
in the machinery of government, and the process will be carried on
whether or not they both avail themselves of it.

(4) As soon as peace and order have been sufficiently res-
tored in Palestine, steps will be taken to carry out this policy of
giving the people of Palestine an increasing part in the government
of their country, the objective being to place Palestinians in charge
of all the Departments of Grovernment, with the assistance of British
advisers and subject to the control of the High Commissioner. With
this object in view His Majesty’s Government will be prepared
immediately to arrange that Palestinians shall be placed in charge of
certain Departments, with British advisers. The Palestinian heads
of ^ Departments will sit on the Executive Council, which advises the
High Commissioner. Arab and Jewish representatives will be invited
to serve as heads of Department approximately in proportion of their
respective populations. The number of Palestinians in charge of
Departments will be increased as circumstances permit until all heads
of Departments are Palestinians, exercising the administrative and
advii^ry functions which are at present performed by British
Officials. ^ When that stage is reached consideration will be given to
the question of converting the Executive Council into a Council of
Ministers mth a consequential change in the status and functions of
the Palestinian heads of Departments.

(5) His Majesty’s Government make no proposals at this
stage- regarding- the- establishment of an elective legislature. Never-
theless, they would regard this as an appropriate constitutional deve-
lopment, and, should public opinion in Palestine hereafter show itself
in favour of -such a development, they will be prepared, provided
that. local conditions permit, to establish the necessary machinery,

(6) At the end of five years from the restoration of peace
and order, an appropriate body representative of the people of
Palestine and of His Majesty’s Government will be set up to review

65

the ■working of the constitutional arrangem^ts during the tradi-
tional period and to consider and make recommendations regarding
tile: constitution of the independent Palestine State.

(7) His Majesty’s Government will require to be satisfied
that, in the treaty contemplated by sub-paragraph (1) or in the
constitution contemplated by sub-paragraph (6), adequate pro-nsion
has been made for; —

(a) The security of, and freedom of access to, the holy places,
and the protection of the interests and property of the
various religious bodies.

(b) The protection of the different communities in Palestine
in accordance with the obligations of His Majesty’s
Government to both Arabs and Jews and for the special
position in Palestine of the Jewish National Home.

(c) Such requirements to meet the strategic situation as may
be regarded as necessary by His Majesty’s Government
in the light of the circumstances then existing.

His Majesty’s Government will also require to be satisfied that
the interests of certain foreign countries in Palestine, for the preser-
vation of which they are at present responsible, are adequately safe-
guarded.

(8) His Majesty’s Government will do everything in their
power to create conditions which ■will enable the independent Pales-
tine State to come into being within ten years. If, at the end of ten
years, it appears to His Majesty’s Government that, contrary to
their hope, circumstances require the postponement of the establish-
ment of the independent State, they will consult with representatives
of the people of Palestine, the Council of the League of Nations and
the neighbouring Arab States before deciding on such a postponement
If His Majesty’s Government come to the conclusion that postpone-
ment is- unavoidable, they will invite the co-operation of these parties
in framing plans for the future -with a view to achieving the desired
objective at the earliest possible date.

11. During the transitional period, steps will be taken to
increase the powers and responsibilities of municipal corporations
and local councils.’

ll IMMIGRATION.

12.' Under Article 6 of the Mandate, the Administration of
Palestine, “while’ ensuring that the rights and position of other
sections of the population are not prejudiced^’, is required to “facili-
tate. Je-wish inundation under suitable conditions’’. Beyond
the extent to which Jewish immigration into Palestine is to be per-
mitted is nowhere defined in the mandate. But in the Command
Paper of 1922 it was laid- down that for the fulfilment of the policy
of establitiiing a- Jewish National Home'!

66

is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine
should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This
immigration cannot be so grant in volume as to exceed whatever
may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to
absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immig-
rants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as
a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the
present population of their employment/'

In practice, from that date onwards until recent times, the
economic absorptive capacity of the country has been treated as the
sole limiting factor, and in the letter which Mr. Kamsay MacDonald,
as Prime Minister, sent to Dr. Weizmann in February 1931 it was
laid down as a matter of policy that economic absorptive capacity
was the sole criterion. This interpretation has been supported by
resolutions of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But His
Majesty’s Government do not read either the Statement of Policy of
1922 or the letter of 1931 as imlying that the mandate requires them,
for all time and in all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of
Jews into Palestine subject only to consideration of the country’s
economic absorptive capacity. Nor do they find anything in the
mandate or in subsequent Statements of Policy to support the view
that the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine cannot
be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely. If
immigration has an adverse effect on the economic position in the
country, it should clearly be restricted ; and equally, if it has a serious-
ly damaging effect on the political position in the country, that is a
factor that should not be ignored . Although it is not difficult to
contend that the large number of Jewish immigrants who have been
admitted so far have been absorbed economically, the fear of the
Arabs that this influx will continue indefinitely until the Jewish
population is in a position to dominate them has produced consequen-
ces which are extremely grave for Jews and Arabs alike and for the
peace and prosperity of Palestine. The lamentable disturbances of
the past three years are only the latest and most sustained manifesta-
tion of this intense Arab apprehension. The methods employed by
Arab terrorists against fellow-Arabs and Jews alike must receive
unqualified condemnation. But it cannot be denied that fear of
indefinite Jewish immigration is widespread amongst the Arab popu-
lation and that this fear has made possible disturbances which have
given a serious setback to economic progress, depleted the Palestine
exchequer, rendered life and property insecure, and produced a
bitterness between the Arab and Jewish populations which is deplor-
able between citizens of the same country. If in these circumstances
immigration is continued up to the economic absorptive capacity of
the country, regardless of all other considerations, a fatal enmity bet-
ween the two peoples will be perpetuated, and the situation in Pales-
tine may become a permanent source of friction amongst all peoples
in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty’s Government cannot
take the ^view that either their obligations under the mandate, or
^nsiderations of common sense and justice, require that they should
ignore these circumstances in framing immigration policy.

13. In the view of the Eoyal Commission, the association of
the policy of the Balfour Declaration with the mandate system imp-
lied the belief that Arab hostitlity to the former would sooner or
later be overcome. It has been the hope of British G-overnments
ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued that, in time, the Arab
population, recognising the advantages to be derived from Jewish
settlement and development in Palestine, would become reconciled
to the further growth of the Jewish National Home. This hope has
not been fulfilled. The alternatives before His Majesty’s Government
are either (i) to seek to expand the Jewish National Home indefinite-
ly by immigration, against the strongly expressed will of the Arab
people of the country; or (ii) to permit further expansion of the
Jewish National Home by immigration only if the Arab are prepared
to acquiesce in it. The former policy means rule by force. Apart
from other considerations, such a policy seems to His Majesty’s
Government to be contrary to the whole spirit of Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as to their specific obliga-
tions to the Arabs in the Palestine mandate. Moreover, the relations
between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine must be based sooner
or later on mutual tolerance and goodwill; the peace, security and
progress of the Jewish Natoinal Home itself require this. Therefore
His Majesty’s Government, after earnest consideration, and taking
into accomit the extent to which the growth of the Jewish National
Home has been facilitated over the last twenty years, have decided
that the time has come to adopt in principle the second of the alter-
natives referred to above.

14. It has been urged that all further Jewish immigration into
Palestine should be stopped forthwith. His Majesty’s Government
cannot accept such a proposal. It would damage the whole of the
financial and economic system of Palestine and thus affect adversely
the interests of Arabs and Jews alike. Moreover, in the view of His
Majesty’s Government, abruptly to stop further immigration would
be unjust to the Jewish National Home. But, above all, His Majesty’s
Government are conscious of the present unhappy plight of large
numbers of Jews who seek a refuge from certain European countries,
and they believe that Palestine can and should make a further con-
tribution to the solution of this pressing world problem. In all these
circumstances, they believe that they will be acting consistently with
their mandatory obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and in the
manner best calculated to serve the interests of the whole people of
Palestine, by adopting the following proposals regarding immigra-
tion:

(1) Jewish immipation during the next five years will be
at a rate which, if economic absorptive capacity permits, will bring
the Jewish population up to approximately one-third of the total
population of the country. Taking into account the expected natural
increase of the Arab and Jewish populations, and the number of
illegal Jewish immigrants now in the country, this would allow of
the admission, as from the beginning of April this year, of some
75,000 immigrants over the next five years. These immigrants would,
subject to the criterion of economic absorptive capacity, be admitted
as follows : — i

68

(a) For each of the next five yeara^ a quota of 10,000 Jewish
imjnigrants will be allowed, on the understanding that a
shortage in any one year may be added to the quotas for
subsequent years, within the five-year period, if economic
absorptive capacity permits.

(&) In addition, as a contribution towards the solution of the
Jewish refugee problem, 25,000 refugees will be admitted
as soon as the High Commissioner is satisfied that ade-
quate provision for their maintenance is ensured, special
consideration being given to refugee children and depen-
dants.

(2) The existing machinery for ascertaining economic
absorptive capacity wdll be retained, and the High Commissioner will
have the ultimate responsibility for deciding the limits of economic
capacity. Before each periodic decision is taken, Jewish and Arab
representatives will be consulted,

(3) After the period of five years, no further Jewish
immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are pre-
pared to acquiesce in it.

(4) His Majesty’s Government are determined to check
illegal immigration, and further preventive measures are being
adopted. The numbers of any Jewish illegal immigrants who, despite
these measures, may succeed in coming into the country and cannot
be deported will be deducted from the yearly quotas.

15. His Majesty’s Government are satisfied that, when the
immigration over five years 'which is now contemplated has taken
place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under
any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish
National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab
population.

IIL LAND.

16. The Administration of Palestine is required, under Article
6 of the mandate, ‘Vhile ensuring that the rights and position of
other sections of the population are not prejudiced” to encourage
y close settlement by Jews on the land”, and no restriction has been
imposed hitherto on the transfer of land from Arabs to Jews. The
reports of several expert Commissions have indicated that, owing to
the natural growth of the Arab population and the steady sale in
recent years of Arab land to Jews, there is now in certain areas no
room for further transfers of Arab land, whilst, in some other areas,
such transfers of land must be restricted if Arab cultivators are to
maintain their existing standard of life and a considerable landless
Arab population is not soon to be created. In these circumstances,
the High Commissioner will be.givmi. general powers to prohibit and
regulate transfers of land. These powers will date from the publi-
cation of this statement of policy and the High Commissioner will
retain them throughout the transitional period.

17. The policy of the Government will he directed towMds the
development of the land and the improvement, where pomble, of
methods of cultivation. In the light of such development it w^ be
open to the High Commissioner, should he be satisfied that the “rights
and position” of the Arab population will be duly preserved, to
review and modify any orders passed relating to the prohibition or
restriction of the transfer of land.

18. In framing these proposals. His Majesty’s Government
have sincerely endeavoured to act in strict accordance with their
obligations under the mandate to both the Arabs and the Jews. The
va^eness of the phrases employed in some instances to describe these
obligations had led to controversy and has made the task of interpre-
tation difficult. His Majesty’s Government cannot hope to satisfy
the partisans of one party or the other in such controversy as the
mandate has aroused. Their purpose is to be just as between the
two peoples in Palestine whose destinies in that country have been
affected by the great events of recent years, and who, since they live
side by side, must learn to practice mutual tolerance, goodwill and
co-operation. In looking to the future. His Majesty’s Government
are not blind to the fact that some events of the past make the task
of creating these relations difficult; but they are encouraged by the
knowledge that at many times and in many places in Palestme during
recent years the Arab and Jewish inhabitants have lived in friend-
ship together. Bach community has much to contribute to the
welfare of their common land, and each must earnestly desire peace
in which to assist in increasing the well-being of the whole people of
the eoimtry. The responsibility which falls on them, no less than
upon His Majesty’s Government, to co-operate together to ensure
peace is all the more solemn because their country is revered by many
millions of Moslems, Jews and Christians throughout the world who
pray for peace in Palestine and for the happiness of her people.

70

Appendix (L)

THE FAISAL-WEIZMANN AGREEMENT

(dated January 3 (?) 1919).

(The source used is a photostat reproduction of the original
document.

Versions of the Agreement have appeared in the Press, but
none <^an be described as being both exact and complete. The
version given in D. H. Miller^s collection of texts (*) is in every
respect identical with the original except that it omits the stipulation
inscribed by Faisal on the Agreement itself.

The Agreement was in English; Faisal’s stipulation was in
Arabic, and was inscribed in the space immediately following the last
Article. A rough summary in English of Faisal’s stipulation, made
by T. E. Lawrence at the time, has gained currency-notably in the
Times of June 10, 1936, and in the report of the Palestine Eoyal
Commission — as being a reliable rendering of the original. In actual
fact, Lawrence’s ^translation^ is a loose and somewhat misleading
paraphrase.

The Agreement is dated January 3, 1919. Prom the internal
evidence in the text of Faisal’s stipulation, it seems probable that it
was signed at a later date, and in any case not earlier than
January 4.)

TEXT OF THE

FAISAL-WEIZMANN AGREEMENT.

His Eoyal Higness the Amir FAISAL, representing and acting
on behalf the Arab Kingdom of HEJAZ, and Dr. CHAIM
WEIZMANN, representing and acting on behalf of the Zionist
Organisation, mindful of the racial kinship and ancient bonds existing
between the Arabs and the Jewish people, and realising that the
surest means of working out the consumption of their national
aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the
devlopment of the Arab State and Palestine, and being desirous
further of confirming the good understanding which exists between
them, have agreed upon the following Articles: —

ARTICLE I.

The Arab State and Palestine in their relations and under-
takings shall be controlled by the most cordial goodwill and under-
standing and to this end Arab and Jewish duly accredited agents
shall be established and maintained in their respective territories.

David Hunter MUer, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, Vol. HI.

71

ARTICLE II.

Immediately following the completion of the deliberations of
the Peace Conference, the definite boundaries between the Arab State
and Palestine shall be determined by a Commission to be agreed upon
by the parties hereto.

ARTICLE III.

In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of
Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest
guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government’s Declara-
tion of the 2nd of November, 1917.

ARTICLE IV.

All necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and stimulate
immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly
as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer
settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil. In taking such
measures the Arab peasant and tenant farmers shall be protected in
their rights, and shall be assisted in forwarding their economic
development.

ARTICLE V.

No regulation nor law shall be made prohibiting or interfering
in any way with free exercise of religion; and further the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall for ever be allowed. No religious
test shall ever be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

ARTICLE VI.

The Mohammedan Holy Places shall be under Mohammedan
control.

ARTICLE VII.

The Zionist Organisation proposes to send to Palestine a
Commission of experts to make a survey of the economic possibilities
of the country, and to report upon the best means for its development.
The Zionist Organisation will place the aforementioned Commission at
the disposal of the Arab State for the purpose of a survey of the
economic possibilities of the Arab State and to report upon the best
means for its development. The Zionist Organisation will use its
best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for
developing the natural resources and economic possibilities thereof.

ARTICLE VIII.

The parties agree to act in complete accord and harmony in all
matters embraced herein before the Peace Congress.

ARTICLE IX.

Any matters of dispute which may arise between the contract-
ing parties shall be referred to the British Government for arbitration.

Given under our hand at LONDON, ENGLAND, the THIRD
day of JANUARY, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND
NINETEEN.

(Translation from the Arabic original).

Provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded in
my Memorandum dated the 4th of January, 1919, to the Foreign
Office of the Government of Great Britain, I shall concur in the
above articles. But if the slightest modification or departure were
to be made (sc in relation to the demands in the Memorandum) I
shall not then be bound by a single word of the present Agreement
which shall be deemed void and of no account or validity, and I shall
not be answerable in any way whatsoever.

FAISAL IBN HUSAIN (in Arabic)
CHAIM WEIZMANN.

78

Appendix (M)

RESOLUTIONS OF THE
GENERAL SYRIAN CONGRESS

(Damascujs, July 2, 1919).

We, the undersigned, members of the General Syrian Congress
assembled in Damascus on the 2nd of July, 1919 and composed of
delegations from the three zones, namely the southern, eastern and
western, (2) and furnished with credentials duly authorising us to
represent the Moslem, Christian and Jewish inhabitants of our respec-
tive districts, have resolved to submit the following as defining the
aspirations of the people who have chosen us to place them before the
American Section of the Inter-Allied Commission. With the excep-
tion of the fifth clause, which was passed by a large majority, the
Eesolutions which follow were all adopted unanimously: —

(1) We desire full and absolute political independence for Syria
within the following boundaries : on the north, the Taurus Range ; on
the south, a line running from Rafah to al-Jauf and following the
Syria-Hejaz border below ^ Aqaba; on the east, the boundary formed
by the Euphrates and Khabur rivers and a line stretching from some
distance cast of Abu-Kamal to some distance east of al-Jauf; on the
west, the Mediterranean Sea.

(2) . We desire the Government of Syria to be a constitutional
monarchy based on principles of democratic and broadly decentra-
lised rule which shall safeguard the rights of minorities, and we wish
that the Amir Faisal who has striven so nobly for our liberation and
enjoyed our full confidence and trust be our King.

(3) In view of the fact that the Arab inhabitants of Syria are
not less fitted or gifted than were certain other nations (such as the
Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks and Rumanians) when granted indepen-
dence, was protest against Article XXII of the Covenant of the League
of Nations which relegates us to the standing of insufficiently deve-
loped races requiring the tutelage of a mandatory power.

(4) If, for whatever reason that might remain undisclosed to
us, the Peace Conference were to ignore this legitimate protest, we
shall regard the mandate mentioned in the Covenant of the League
of Nations as implying to more than the rendering of assistance in the
technical and economic fields without impairment of our absolute
independence. We rely on President Wilson's declarations that his
object in entering the War was to put an end to acquisitive designs
for imperialistic purposes. In our desire that our country should
not be made a field for colonisation, and in the belief that the Ameri-
can nation is devoid of colonial ambitions and has no political designs
on our country, we resolve to seek assistance in the technical and
economic fields from the United States of America on the understand-
ing that the duration of such assistance shall not exceed twenty years.

(1) The text given here is my own rendering of the text published at the time

in the Arabic Press.

(2) i.e.i the three O.E.T.As.

74

(5) In the event of the United States finding herself unable to
accede to our request for assistance, we would seek it from Great
Britain, provided always that it will not be allowed to impair the
unity and absolute independence of our country and that its duration
shall not exceed the period mentioned in the proceeding clause

(6) We do not recognise to the French Government any right
to any part of Syria, and we re;)ect all proposals that France should
give us assistance or exercise authority in any portion of the country.

(7) We reject the claims of the Zionists for the establishment
of a Jewish commonwealth in that part of southern Syria which is
known as Palestine, and we are opposed to Jewish immigration into
any part of the country. We do not acknowledge that they have a
title, and we regard their claims as a grave menace to our national,
political and economic life. Our Jewish fellow-citizens shall continue
to enjoy the rights and to bear the responsibilities which are ours in
common.

(8) We desire that there should be no dismemberment of Syria,
and no separation of Palestine or the costal region in the west or
the Lebanon from the mother country; and we ask that the unity of
the country be maintained under any circumstances.

(9) We desire that Iraq should enjoy complete independence,
and that no economic barriers be placed between the two countries.

(10) The basic principles proclaimed by President Wilson in
condemnation of secret treaties cause us to enter an emphatic protest
against any agreement providing for the dismemberment of Syria (l)
and against any undertaking envisaging the recognition of Zionism (2)
in southern Syria ; and we ask for the explicit annulment of all such
agreements and undertakings.

The lofty principles proclaimed by President Wilson encourage
us to believe that the determining consideration in the settlement of
our own future will be the real desires of our people ; and that we may
look to President Wilson and the liberal American nation, who are
known for their sincere and generous sympathy with the aspirations
of weak nations, for help in the fulfilment of our hopes.

We also fully believe that the Peace Conference will recognise
that we would not have risen against Turkish rule under which we
enjoyed civic and political privileges, as well as rights of representa-
tion, had it not been that the Turks denied us our right to a national
existence. We believe that the Peace Conference will meet our de-
sires in full, if only to ensure that our political privileges may not be
less, after the sacrifices of life which we have made in the cause of
our freedom, than they were before the War.

We desire to be allowed to send a delegation to represent us at
the Peace Conference, advocate our claims and secure the fulfilment
of our aspirations.

(1) sc. The Sykes-Pieot Afi^reement.

(2) sc. The Balfoax Beclaratiom.

75

Appendix (N)

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE KING-CRANE
COMMISSION WITH REGARD TO
SYRIA-PALESTINE AND IRAQ.

(August 28, 1919).

1. SYRIA-PALESTINE.

A. We recommend, as most important of all, and in strict
harmony with our Instructions, that whatever foreign administration
(whether of one or more Powers) is brought into Syria, should come
in, not at all as a colonising Power in the old sense of that term, but
as a Mandatory under the League of Nations with the clear conscious-
ness that 'the well-being and development of the Syrian people form
for it a 'sacred trust’.

(1) To this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the
time of expiration to be determined by the League of
Nations, in the light of all the facts as brought out from
year to year, in the annual reports of the Mandatory to
the League or in other ways.

(2) The mandatory Administration should have, however, a
period and power sufficient to ensure the success of the
new state; and especially to make possible carrying
through important educational and economic undertak-
ings, essential to secure founding of the State.

(3) The mandatory Administration should be characterised
from the beginning by a strong and vital educational
emphasis in clear recognition of the imperative necessity
of education for the citizens of a democratic state, and
for the development of a sound national spirit. This
systematic cultivation of national spirit is particularly
required in a country like Syria, which has only recently
come to self-consciousness.

(4) The Mandatory should definitely seek, from the beginning
of its trusteeship, to train the Syrian people to indepen-
dent self-government as rapidly as conditions allow, by
setting up all the institutions of a democratic state, and
by sharing with them increasingly the work of adminis-
tration, and so forming gradually an intelligent citizen-
ship, interested unselfishly in the progress of the country,
and forming at the same time a large group of disciplined
civil servants.

(5) The period of 'tutelage’ should not he unduly prolonged,
but independent self-government should be granted as

(1) Text copied from Editor and Publisher (IsTew York), issue dated
December 2, 1922.

76

.soon as it can safely be done; remembering that the
primary business of governments is not the accomplisli*
ment of certain things, but the development of citizens.

(6) It is peculiarly the duty of the Mandatory in a country
like Syria, and in this modern age, to see that complete
religioris liberty is ensured, both in the constitution and
in the practice of the state, and that a jealous care is
exercised for the rights of all minorities. Nothing is
more vital than this for the enduring success of the new
Arab State.

(7) In tlie economic development of Syria, a dangerous
amount of indebtedness on the part of the new state
.should be avoided, as well as any entanglements finan-
cially with the affairs of the mandatory Power. On the
other hand, the legitimate established privileges of
foreigners, such as rights to maintain schools, commercial
concessions, etc., should be preseiwed, but subject to
review and modification under the authority of the
League of Nations in the interest of Syria. The manda-
tory Power should not take advantage of its position to
force a monopolistic control at any point to the detriment
either of Syria or of other nations ; but it should seek to
bring the new State as rapidly as possible to economic
independence as well as to political independence

Whatever is done concerning the fiirther recommen-
dations of the Commission, the fulfilment of at least the
conditions now named should be assured, if the Peace
Gnoference and the League of Nations are true to the
policy of mandatories already embodied in the Covenant
of the League of Nations. This should effectively guard
the most essential interests of Syria, however the machi-
nery of administration is finally organised. The Damas-
cus* Congress betrayed in many ways their intense fear
that their country, would become, though under some
other name, simply a colonial possession of some other
Power That fear must be completely allayed.

B We recommend, in the second place, that the unity of Ssnria
be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great
majority of the people of Syria.

(1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too
small, and the economic, geographic, racial and language
unity too manifest, to m&e the setting up of independ-
ent Stat^ within its boundaries desirable, if such division
can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely
Arab in language, culture, traditions, and customs.

(2) This recommendation is in line with important ‘general
considerations’ already urged, and with the principles
of the League of Nations, as well as in answer to the
desires of the majority of the population concerned.

77

(3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by
a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian
territory has been in general allotted. The Commissioners
believe, however, that the claim of the Damascus Con-
ference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either
historically or by commercial or language relations. The
line between the Arabic-speaking and the Turkish-
speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia
with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has
no such need of further seacoast as the large interior
sections of Asia Minor.

(4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of
Syria, the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon,
which have already had a measure of independence,
should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity,
undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy,
and especially in the case of strongly unified groups.
Even the ^Damascus Programme^ which presses so ear-
nestly the unity of Syria, istelf urges a government ‘on
broad decentralisation principles.'

Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of pros-
perity and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She
certainly should not find her legitimate aspirations less
possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary
it may be confidently expected that both her economic
and political relations with the rest of Syria would be
better if she were a constituent member of the State
rather than entirely independent of it.

As a predominantly Christian country, too, Lebanon
naturally fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria.
But against such domination she would have a four-fold
safeguard: her own large autonomy; the presence of a
strong mandatory for the considerable period in which
the constitution and practice of the new State would be
forming ; the oversight of the League of Nations, with ite
insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minori-
ties ; and the certainty that the Arab Government would
feel the necessity of such a State, if it were to commend
itself to the League of Nations. Moreover, there would
be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if
Christiana were present in the State in considerable
numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the
State, as experience of the relations of different religious
faiths in India suggests.

As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be
noted- that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a
stronger and more helpful influence if she were with the
Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing
all ita life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her
own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger inter-
ests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, tiien, the unity of
Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more
thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar

statement might be made for Palestine; though, as the
Holy Land for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike,
its situation is unique, and might more readily justify
unique treatment, if such treatment were justified any-
where. This will be discussed more particularly in
connexion with the recommendation concerning Zionism.

C. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be placed
under one mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and
efficient unity.

(1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria
among several mandatories, even if existing national
unity were recognised ; or to attempt a joint mandatory
of the whole on the commission plan: — neither of these
course would be naturally suggested as the best way to
secure and promote the unity of the new State, or even
the general unity of the whole people. It is conceivable
that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to
some such form of divided Mandate; but; it is not a
solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view
of the larger interests of the people, as considerations
already urged indicate.

(2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are
handled politically, the people of Syria are there, forced
to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to
live with one another — ^the Arabs of the Bast and the
people of the coast, the Moslems and the Christians.
Will they be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable
and finally cordial relations, by a single mandatory? No
doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of
difficult relations is to split the people up into
little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubt-
edly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the
relations are so intolerable as to make some division
imperative and inevitable. But in general, to attempt
complete separation only accentuates the differences and
increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the
modern social consciousness points to the necessity of
understanding Hhe other half’, as it can be understood
only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable
local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single
mandatory ought to form a constant and increasingly
effective help to unity of feeling throughout the State,
and ought to steadily improve group relations.

The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves
o^n insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have
hitherto prevailed among various groups, it has been
very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish
Government. When justice is done impartially to all ;
when it becomes plain that the aim of the common
government is the service of all classes alike, not their
exploitation, then can decent human relations be secured
— a foundation which could not be obtained by dividing
men off from one another in antagonistic groups.

19

The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest
future good of all groups and regions alike, the placing
of the whole of Syria under a single Mandate.

D. We recommend, in the fourth place, that Amir Faisal be
made head of the new united Syrian State.

(1) This is expressly and unanimously asked for by the
representative Damascus Congress in the name of the
Syrian people, and there seems to be no reason to doubt
that the great majority of the population of Syria since-
rely desire to have Amir Faisal as ruler.

(2) A constitutional monarchy along democratic lines, seems
naturally adapted to the Arabs, with their long training
under tribal conditions, and with their traditional respect
for their Chiefs. They seem to need, more than most
people, a king as the personal symbol of the power of the
State,

(3) Amir Faisal has come, too, naturally into his present
place of power, and there is no one else who could well
replace him. He has the great advantage of being the
son of the Sharif of Mecca, and as such honoured
throughout the Moslem world. He was one of the promi-
nent Arab leaders who assumed responsibility for the
Arab uprising against the Turks, and so shared in the
complete deliverance of the Arabic-speaking portions of
the Turkish Empire. He was consequently hailed by
the Damascus Congress as having merited their full
confidence and entire reliance. He was taken up and
supported by the British as the most promising candi-
date for the headship of the new Arab State — an Arab
of the Arabs, but with a position of wide appeal through
his Sharifian connection, and through his broad sympa-
pathies with the best in the Occident. His relations
with the Arabs to the east of Syria are friendly, and his
kingdom would not be threatened from that side. He
undoubtedly does not make so strong an appeal to the
Christians of the West Coast, as to the Arabs of the Bast;
but no man can be named who would have a stronger
general appeal. He is tolerant and wise, skilful in dealing
with men, winning in manner, a man of sincerity, insight
and power. Whether he has the full strength needed for
his difficult task it is too early to say; but certainly no
other Arab leader combines so many elements of power
as he, and he will have invaluable help throughout the
mandatory period.

The Peace Conference may take geniune satisfaction
in the fact that an Arab of such qualities is available for
the headship of this new state in the Near Bast.

80

E. We recommend, in the fifth place, serious modification of
the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited immgra-
tion of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish
State.

(1) The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with
minds predisposed in its favour, but the actual facts in
Palestine, coupled with the force of the general principles
proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians
have driven them to the recommendation here made,

(2) The Commission was abundantly supplied with literature
on the Zionist programme by the Zionist Commission to
Palestine; heard in conferences much concerning the
Zionist colonies and their claims; and personally saw
something of what had been accomplished. They found
much to approve in the aspirations and plans of the
Zionists, and had warm appreciation for the devotion of
many of the colonists, and for their success, by modem
methods, in overcoming great natural obstacles.

(3) The Commission recognised also that definite encourage-
ment had been given to the Zionists by the Allies in Mr.
Balfour’s often-quoted statement, in its approval by
other representatives of the Allies. If, however, the
strict terms of the Balfour Statement are adhered to —
favouring ‘the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people’, it being clearly understood
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non- Jewish communi-
ties in Palestine — it can hardly be doubted that the
extreme Zionist programme must be greatly modified.

For a national home for the Jewish people is not
equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor
can the erection of such a Jewish State be accomplished
without the gravest trespass upon the civil and religious
rights of existing non- Jewish communities in Palestine.
The fact came out repeatedly in the Commission’s con-
ferences with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists
looked forward to a practically complete dispossession
of the present non- Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by
various forms of purchase.

In his adress of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid
down the following principles as one of the four great
‘end for which the associated peoples of the world were
fighting’: The settlement of every question, whether of
territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of
political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance
of that settlement by the people immediately concerned,
and not upon the basis of the material interest or of any
other nation or people which may desire a different settle-
ment for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

8i

If that principle is to rule, and so the "wishes of Palestine *s
population are to he decisi"ve as to "what is to be done "with
Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Je"wish
population of Palestine — ^nearly nine-tenths of the whole-
are emphatically against the entire Zionist programme.
The tables show that there was no one thing upon which
the population of Palestine were more agreed "than upon
"this. To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish
immigration, and to steady financial and socied press"ure
to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the
principle just quoted, and of the people’s rights, though
it kept "within the forms of law.

It is to be noted also that the feeling against the
Zionist programme is not confined to Palestine, but shared
very generally by the people throughout Syria, as our
conferences clearly showed. More than seventy-two per
cent — 1,350 in all — of all the petitions in the whole of
Syria were directed against the Zionist programme. Only
"two requests — ^those for a "united Syria and for indepen-
dence — had a larger support. This general feeling was
duly voiced by the Gmieral Syrian Congress in the
seventh, eight and tenth resolutions of "the Statement.

The Peace Conference should not shut its eyes to the
fact that the anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine and Syria
is intense and not lightly to be flouted. No British
officer, consulted by the Commissioners, belived that the
Zionist prograname coxild be carried out except by force
of arms. The officers generally thought that a force not
less than 50,000 soldiers would be required even to initiate
the programme. That of itself is evidence of a strong
sense of the injustice of the Zionist programme, on "the
part of the non-Jewish populations of Palestine and
Syria. Decisions requiring armies to carry out are some-
times necessary, but they are surely not gratuitously to
be taken in the interests of serious injustice. For the
i n itial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives,
that they have a ‘right’ to Palestine, based on an occupa-
tion of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously
considered.

Tkere is a further consideration that cannot justly be
ignord, if the world is to look forward to Palestine
becoming a definitely Je"wish State, however gradually
that may take place. That consideration grows out of
the fact that Palestine is the Holy Band for Jews,
Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians
and Moslems all over the world are quite as much
concerned as "the Jews with conditions in Palestine,
especially with those conditions which touch upon
rdlgious f eel i n g and rights. The relaticns in these
matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. 'With.
the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether

82

the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or
Moslems proper guardians of the holy places, or custo-
dians of the Holy Land as a whole.

The reason is this: The places which are most sacred
to Christians — ^those having to do with Jesus — and which
are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to
Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible,
under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians
to feel satisjSed to have these places in Jewish hands, or
under the custody of Jews. There are still other places
about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In
fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because
the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them,
have made very naturally much more satisfactory custo-
dians of the holy places than the Jews could be. It must
be believed that the precise meaning in this respect of the
complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been
fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist
programme. For it would intensify, with a certainty
like fate, the anti- Jewish feeling both in Palestine and in
all other portions of the World which look to Palestine
as the Holy Land.

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep
sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the Commis-
sioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly
reduced Ziosnist programme be attempted by the Peace
Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated.
This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should
be definitely limited, and that the project for making
Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be
given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not
be included in a united Syrian State, just as other por-
tions of the country, the holy places being cared for by an
international and inter-religious commission, somewhat as
at present, under the oversight and approval of the
Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of
course, would have representation upon this commission.

The recommendations now made lead naturally to the necessity
of recommending what power shall undertake the single Mandate for
all Syria.

(1) The considerations already dealt with suggest the qualifica-
tions idealy to be desired in the mandatory Power: First of all, it
should be freely desired by the people. It should be willing to enter
heartily into the spirit of the mandatory system, and its possible gift
to the world, and so be willing to withdraw after a reasonable period,
and not seek selfishly to exploit the country. It should have a passion
for democracy, for the education of the common people and for the
development of the national spirit. It needs unlimited sympathy and
patience in what is practically certain to be a rather thankless task •

88

for no Power can go on honestly to face actual conditions (like land-
ownership, for example) and seek to correct these conditions, without
making many enemies. It should have experience in dealing with
less developed peoples, and abundant resources in men and money.

(2) Probably no Power combines all these qualifications,
certainly not in equal degree. But there is hardly one of these
qualifications that has not been more or less definitely indicated in
our conference with the Syrian people and they certainly suggest a
new stage in the development of the self-government spirit in the
relations of peoples to one another. The Power that undertakes the
single Mandate for all Syria, in the spirit of these qualifications, will
have the possibility of greatly serving not only Syria but the world,
and of exalting at the same time its own national life. For it would
be working in direct line with the high aims of the Allies in the War,
and give proof that those high aims had not been abandoned. And
that would mean very much just now, in enabling the nations to keep
their faith in one another and in their highest ideals.

(8) The Resolutions of the Peace Conference of January 30,
1919, quoted in our instructions, expressly state for regions to be
‘completely severed from the Turkish Empire’, that ‘the wishes of
these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of
the mandatory Power’. Our survey left no room for doubt of the choice
of the majority of the Syrian people. Although it was not known
whether America would take a Mandate at all; and although the
Commission could not only give no assurances upon that point, but
had rather to discourage expectation, nevertheless, upon the face of
the returns, America was the first choice of 1,152 of the petitions
presented — ^more than sixty per cent — while no other Power had as
much as fifteen per cent for first choice.

And the conference showed that the people knew the grounds
upon which they registered their choice for America. They declared
that their choice was due to knowledge of America’s record; the
unselfish aims with which she had come into the War; the faith in
her felt by multitudes of Syrians who had been in America; the
spirit revealed in American educational institutions in Syria,
especially the College (i) in Bairut, with its well-known and constant
encouragement of Syrian national sentiment ; their belief that America
had no territorial or colonial ambitions, and would willingly withdraw
when the Syrian State was well established as her treatment both of
Cuba and the Philippines seemed to them to illustrate ; her genuinely
democratic spirit; and her ample resources.

Prom the point of view of the desires of the ‘people concerned’,
the Mandate should clearly go to America.

(4) From the point of view of qualifications, too, already stated
as needed in the M^datory for Syria, America, as first choice of the
people, probably need not fear careful testing, point by point, by the
standard involved in our discussion of qualifications; though she has
much less experience in such work than Great Britain, and is likely

(1) The Syrian Protestante College founded in 1866, see Chapter HI,

Section 4, supra.

84

to show less patience ; and though her definite connexions with Syria
have been less numerous and close than those of Prance. She would
have at least the great qualification of fervent belief in the new
mandatory system of the League of Nations, as indicating the proper
relations which a strong nation should take toward a weaker one.
And, though she would undertake the Mandate with reluctance, she
could probably be brought to see how logically the taking of such
responsibility follows from the purposes with which she entered the
War, and from her advocacy of the League of Nations.

(5) There is a further consideration that America could probably
come into the Syrian situation, in the beginning at least, with less
friction than any other Power. The great majority of Syrian people,
as has been seen, favour her coming, rather than that of any other
Power. Both the British and the French would find it easier to
yield their respective claims to America than to each other. She
would have no rival imperial interests to press. She would have
abundant resources for the development of the sound prosperity of
Syria; and this would inevitably benefit in a secondary way the
nations which have had closest connexion with Syria, and so help to
keep relations among the Allies cordial. No other Power probably
would be more welcome as a neighbour to the British with their large
interests in Egypt, Arabia and Iraq; or to the Arabs and Syrians
in these regions; or to the French with their long-established and
many-sided interests in Bairut and the Lebanon.

(6) The objections to recommending at once a single American
Mandate for all Syria are: First of all, that it is not certain that
the American people would be willing to take the Mandate; that it
is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw,
and would cordially welcome America coming, a situation which
might prove steadily harassing to an American administration; that
the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might
prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large
influential Jewish population; and that; if America were to take any
mandate at all, and were to take but one mandate, it is probable that
an Asia Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. For
there is a task there of such peculiar and world-wide significance as to
appeal to the best in America, and demand the utmost from her, and
as certainly to justify her in breaking with her established policy
concernii^ mixing in the affairs of the eastern hemisphere. The
Commi^ionera believe, moreover, that no other Power could come
i^ Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all
the peoples concerned.

To these objections, as a whole, it is to be said that they are
all of such a kind that they may resolve themselves; and that they
obriacles that must be expected in so large and
agnifloa^ an undert^dng, In any case- they do not relieve the
Commissnmers from the dnty of recommending the course, «nd the
one for which the whole situation rniifi

T^ Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the

th^ &e Umted States o£ America be aisfced to
undertake the smgle Mandate for all Ayria,

85

If for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to America,
then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express
request of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be
given to Great Britain. The tables show that there were 1,073
petitions in all Syria for Great Britain as mandatory, if America did
not take the Mandate. This is very greatly in excess of any similar
expression for the French.

On the contrary — for whatever reason — ^more than sixty per cent
of all the petitions presented to the Commission directly and strongly
protested against French mandate. Without going into discussion of
the reasons for this situation, the Commissioners are reluctantly
compelled to believe that this situation itself makes it impossible to
recommend a single French Mandate for all Syria.

The feeling of the Arabs of the Bast is particularly strong
against the French. And there is grave reason to believe that the
attempt to enforce a French Mandate would precipitate war between
the Arabs and the French, and force upon Great Britain a dangerous
alternative. The Commissioners may perhaps be allowed to say that
this conclusion is contrary to their own earlier hope, that — ^because of
Prance’s long and intimate relations with Syria, because of her
unprecedented sacrifices in the War, and because the British Empire
seemed certain to receive far greater accessions of territory from the
War — it might seem possible to recommend that France be given the
entire Mandate for Syria But the longer the Commission remained
in Syria, the more clear it became that that course could not be taken.

The Commissioners recommend, therefore, if America cannot
take the mandate for all Syria, that it be given to Great Britain,
because of the choice of the people concerned; because she is already
on the ground and with much of the necessary work in hand ; because
of her trained administrators; because of her long and generally
successful experience in dealing with less developed peoples; and
because she has so many of the qualifications needed in a mandatory
Power as we have already considered them.

We should hardly be doing justice, however, to our sense of
responsibility to the Syrian people, if we did not frankly add some
at least of the reasons and misgivings, variously expressed and
implied in our conferences, which led to the preference for an
American Mandate over a British Mandate. The people repeatedly
showed honest fear that in British hands the mandatory power would
become simply a colonising power of the old kind ; that Great Britain
would find it difiBcult to give up the colonial theory, especially in
case of a people thought inferior; that she would favour a civil
service and pension budget too expensive for a poor people ; that the
interests of Syria would be subordinated to the supposed needs of
the Empire ; that there would be, after all, too much exploitation of
the country for Britain’s benefit; that she would never be ready to
withdraw and give the country real independence; that she did not
really believe in universal education, and would not provide
adequately for it; and that she already had more territory in her
possession — ^in spite of her fine colonial record — ^than was good either
for herself or for the world.

86

These misgivings of the Syx’ian people unquestionahly largely
explain their demand for ^absolute independence’, for a period of
'assistance’ of only twenty years, their protest against Article XXII
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, etc. They all mean that
whatever Power the Peace Conference shall send into Syria, should
go in as a true mandatory under the League of Nations, and for
a limited term. Any thing else would be a betrayal of the Syrian
people.

It needs to be emphasised, too, that under a true mandatory for
Syria, all the legitimate interests of all the nations in Syria would
be safeguarded. In particular, there is no reason why any tie that
Prance had had with Syria in the past should be severed or even
weakened under the control of another mandatory Power, or in an
independent Syria.

There remains only to be added that, if Prance feels as intensely
coneerning her present claims in Syria as to threaten all cordial
relations among the Allies, it is, of course, possible to give her a
Mandate over the Lebanon (not enlarged) separated from the rest
of Syria, as is desired by considerable groups in that region. For
reasons already given, the Commissioners cannot recommend this
course, but it is a possible arrangement.

IL IRAQ<’^

In view of the Resolutions, passed by the Peace Conference on
January 30, 1919, and of the Anglo-French Declaration of November
7, 1918 — on the eve of the Armistice — ^both of which documents class
Syria and Iraq together to be treated in the same way, and make to
them the same promises and assurances, the Commissioners recommend
that the Peace Conference adopt for Iraq a policy in general parallel
to that recommended for Syria, in order that the Anglo-Ptench
Declaration may not become another 'scrap of paper’.

1. We accordingly recommend, as most important of all, and in
strict harmony with our instructions, that whatever foreign
administration is brought into Iraq should come into Iraq not at all as
a colonising power in the old sense of that term, but as a mandatory
under the League of Nations, with clear consciousness that the 'well-
being and development’ of the people form for it a sacred trust. To
this end the Mandate should have a limited term, the time of expira-
tion to be determined by the League of Nations, in the light of all
the facts as brought out from year to year, whether in the annual
reports of the mandatory to the League or in other ways.

The entire text of the first recommendation for Syria, with its
subordinate recommendations, applies point to point to Iraq as truly
as to Syria.

(1) !Por the sake of uniformity, I have replaced ‘Mesopotamia* hy Iraq
throughout, and made certain orthographical changes in proper names*

87

If the peace conference, the League of Nations, and the appointed
mandatory Power loyally carry out the policy of mandatories
embodied in the Covenant of the Leage of Nations, the most essential
interests of Iraq would be fully safeguarded — ^but only so,

2. We recommend, in the second place, that the unity of Iraq
be preserved; the precise boundaries to be determined by a special
commission on boundaries, after the Mandate has been assigned. It
should be linked up with Iraq. The wisdom of a united country
needs no argument in the case of Iraq.

3. We recommend, in the third place, that Iraq be placed under
one mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efBeient
unity. The economic, political, social and educational development
of the people all call for such a unified mandate. Only waste,
confusion, and injury to the people’s interests could come from
attempting a division and 'spheres of influence’ on the part of several
nations. But this implies that the mandatory Power shall not itself
be an exploiting Power, but shall sacredly guard the people’s rights.

4. Since it is plainly desirable that there be general harmony
in the political and economic institutions and arrangements of Iraq
and -Syria; and since the people themselves should have chief voice
in determining the form of government under which they shall live,
we recommend that the Government of Iraq, in harmony with the
apparent desires of its people, be a Constitutional Monarchy; such
as is proposed for Syria; and that the people of Iraq be given
opportunity to indicate their choice of a Monarch, the choice to be
reviewed and confirmed by the League of Nations. It may be fairly
assumed that the 1,278 petitions from Syrians for the independence
of Iraq — ^68.5 per cent of the total number received — ^reflect the feeling
in Iraq itself ; and such contact as we have been able to secure with
Iraqis confirms the assumption, and leads to the belief that the
programme, presented at Aleppo by representative Iraqis, headed by
Ja’far Pasha, Military Governor of the Aleppo District and
practically parallel to the Damascus Programme, would be generally
supported by the Iraqi people. Whether this support extends to
each item in the programme alike, and so to the naming of a king
from the sons of the King of the Hejaz, we have not sufficient data
to determine, and so have recommended that a plebiscite be taken
upon that point, although there is British evidence that many Iraqis
have expressed themselves in favour of one of the sons of the king
of the Hejaz as Amir.

5. The Iraqi Programme expresses its choice of America as
mandatory, and with no second choice. Undoubtedly there has been
a good deal of feeling in Iraq against Great Britain, and the petitions
specifically charge the British authorities in Iraq with considerable
interference with freedom of opinion, of expression, and of travel —
much of which might be justified in time of milita^ occupation. But
feeling so stirred might naturally breed unwillingness to express
desire for Great Britain as mandatory.

On the other hand, the material in the pamphlet called 'Copies
and Translations of Declarations and other Documents relating to

88

Self-Detei^mination in Iraq’ was called out by an attempt on the
part of the British Government in Iraq to secure the opinions of
leading men of all groups concerning ‘self-determ^tion’. This
material, just because reported directly to British officials, is doubtlesf
somewhat more favourable to the British than it would otherwise be ;
but it gives unquestionably good evidence of much opinion likely to
choice a Bintish Mandate. And after all, the range of choice of a
mandatory, of sufficient power and experience and of essential justice,
is dieidedly limited, and it is by no means improbable that if the
Iraqis were confronted by a refusal of America to take a Mandate
for Iraq, they would make Great Britain at least second choice, as
the majority of the Syrians did. There is supplementary evidence
also upon this point.

Now it seems so unlikely that America could or would take a
Mandate for Iraq, in addition to the possible considerations of Syria
and Asia Minor, that the Commissioners recommend that the Peace
Conference assign the Mandate for Iraq to Great Britain : because of
the general reasons already given for recommending her as mandatory
in Syria, if America does not go in there ; because she is probably best
of all fitted for the particular task involved, in view of her long
relations with Arabs ; in recognition of the sacrifices made by her in
delivering Iraq from the Turks, though with no acknowledgment of
right of conquest, as her own statements expressly disclaim; because
of the special intei’ests she naturally has in Iraq on account of its
nearness to India and its close connexions with Arabia ; and because
of work already done in the territory.

These reasons make it probable that the largest interests of the
people of Iraq as a whole will be best served by a British Mandate,
in spite of the fact that from the point of view of world-interests,
in the prevention of jealousy, suspicion, and fear of domination by
a single Power, it were better for both Britain and the ^vorld that
no further territory anywhere be added to the Bx'itish Empire. A
British Mandate, however, will have the decided advantage of tending
to promote economic and educational unity throughout Iraq and
Syria, whether Syria be under Great Britain or America, and so will
reflect more fully than ever before the close relations, in language
customs, and trade between these parts of the former Turkish Empire

In a country so rich as Iraq in agricultural possibilities, in oil,
and in other resources, with best intentions, there. will ine\dtably be
danger of exploitation and monopolistic control by the Mandatory
Power, through making British interests supreme, and especially
through large Indian immigration. This danger will need increas-
ingly and most honestly to be guarded against. The Iraqis feel very
strongly the menace particularly of Indian irqmigration, even thougl
that immigration should be confined to Moslems. They dread the
admixture of another people of entirely different race and customs,
as threatening their Arabic civilisation.

Respectfully submitted,

HBNE.T 0. KING,
CHARLES R. CRANE.

89

Appendix (O)

THE CHURCHILL MEMORANDUM,

(June 5, 1922,)

(British White Paper, Cmd. 1700)

Prcambk— The Secretary of State for the Colonies has given
renewed consideration to the existing political situation in Palestine
with a very earnest desire to arrive at a settlement of the outstanding
questions which have given rise to uncertainty and unrest among
certain sections of the population After consultation with the High
Coiiiinissioner for Palestine the following statement has been drawn
up It summarises the essential parts of the correspondence that has
already taken place between the Secretary of State and a Delegation
from the Moslem-Christian Society of Palestine, which has been for
some time in England, and it states the further conclusions which
have since been reached.

The tension which has prevailed from time to time in Palestine
is mainly due to apprehesions, which are entertained both by sections
of tbe Arab and of the Jewish population These apprehensions, so
far as the Arabs are concerned, are partly based upon the exaggerated
interpretations of the meaning of the Declaration favouring the
establishment of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, made on
behalf of His Majesty’s Government on November 2, 1917. Unautho-
rised statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in
view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used
such as that Palestine is to become ‘‘as Jewish as England is
English” His Majesty’s Government regard any such expectation as
impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any
tune contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation,
the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic popula-
tion, language or culture in Palestme They would draw attention
to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not
contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a
Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in
Palestine. In this connection it has been observed with satisfaction
that at the meeting of the Zionist Congress, the supreme governing
body of the Zionist Organisation, held m Carlsbad in September,
1921, a resolution was passed expressing as the ofScial statement of
Zionist aims “the determination of the Jewish people to live with
the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect, and together
with them to make the common home into a flourishing community,
the up-building of which may assure to each of its peoples an
undisturbed national development.” .

It is also necessary to point out that the Zionist Commission
in Palestine, now termed the Palestine Zionist Executive, has not
desired to possess, - and does not possess, any share in the general
administration of the country. * Nor does the special position assigned :
to the Zionist Organisation in Article 4 of the Draft Mandate for

90

Palestine imply any such functions. That .special position relates
to the measures to be taken in Palestine affecting the Jewish popula-
tion, and contemplates that the organisation may assist in the general
development of tbe country, but does not entitle it to share in any
degree in its Government.

Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of
Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never
been intended that they, or any section of them-, should possess any
other juridical status.

So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it
apjiears tliat some among them are apprehensive that His Maje.sty s
Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration
of 1917 It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these
fears are unfoumleil, and tliat that Declaration, r(‘-affirnied by ti^e
Gonference of t] e Principal Allied Powei’s at San Remo and again in
the 'Treaty of Sevres, is not susceptible of elianu’o

During the last two or Ihree generations tlie Jews have re-created
in Palestine a community, now niiinboring 80,000, of whom about
one-fonrtli are farmers or workers on the land. Tins communil y has
its <AMi ]iolitical organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its
domesti(- conceims; elei-ted (miincils in t'‘e towns; and an organisation
for the control of its ^'cdiools. It has its elected Cdiief Rabbinate and
Rabbinicial (Vinncil for the dire(*tion of its religious affairs It^
Inisiness is conducted in Hebreu as a vernacular language, ami a
HebreA\^ pres-; ‘•'^‘rM?s its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life
and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then,
with its town and country population, its political, religious and
social organisations, its own language, its own <mstoms, its own life,
has in fact ''national” eliaract eristics When it is asked what is
meant hy the development of the Jewish Xationai Home in Palestine,
it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality
upon f’e inhabitants of P'alestine as a wdiole, but the further develop-
ment cf the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews
in otlior parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in
which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion
and race, an intere'-d and a pride. Hut in order tlmt this community
should have the best prospect of development and provide a full
opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is
essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and
not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary fiat the
existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be inter-
nationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to
rest upon ancient historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty’s Govern-
ment place upon the Declaration of ^ 1917, and, so understood, the
Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply
anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of
PWestine or disappointment to the Jews.

,, ' JPbr the fnlJilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish
Sopmoffinit^" in' Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by
imtnigration. ' This immigration cannot be >so great in voluine as to

91

-exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the
tinie^ to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the
immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as
a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present
population of their employment. Hitherto the immigration has
fulfilled these conditions. The number of immigrants since the
British occupation has been about 25,000.

Tt IS necessary also to ensure that persons who are politically
undesirable are excluded from Palestine, and every precaution has
been and will be taken by the Administration to that end.

Tt is intended that a special committee should be established in
Palestine, consisting entirely of members of the new Legislation
Council elected by the peoiDie, to confer with the Administration upon
matters relating to the regulation of immigration. Should any
difference of opinion arise between this committee and the Adminis-
tration, t<'e matter will be referred to His Majesty’s Government,
who will give it special consideration. In addition, under Article 81
oi‘ (lie draft Palestine Order in Council, any religions eommimity or
.considerable section of the population of Palestine will have a general
right to appeal, through the High Coinmis.sioner and the Secretary
of State, to the League of Nations on any matter on which they may
i-oiisuler that the terms of the Mandate are not fulfilled by the
Oovernineut of Palestine.

'Witli reference to the C^onstitution which it is now intended lo
establish in Palestine, the draft of tvMch has already been published,
it IS desirable to make certain points clear In the fiirst place it is
not the case, as has been represented by the Arab Delegation, that
during the war His Majesty’s Government gave an undertaking that
im independent national government should at once be established in
Palestine This representation mainly rests upon a letter dated
October 24, 1915, from Sir Henry MacMalion, then His Majesty’s
High Commissioner in Egypt, to the Sherif of Mecca, now ,King
Hussein of the Kingdom of the Heja'?: That letter is quoted as
conveying the promise to the Sherif of Mecca to recognise and
support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed
by him But this promise was given subject to a reservation made
in the same letter which excluded from its scope, among other
territories, the portions of Syria lying to the west of the district of
Damascus. This reservation has always been regarded by His
Majesty’s Government as covering the vilayet of Beirut and the
independent Sunjak of Jerusalem. The whole of Palestine west of
the Jordan w^as thus excluded from Sir H, McMahon’s pledge.

Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty’s Government to
foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in
Palestine. But they are of opinion that, in the special circumstances
of that country, this should be accomplished by gradual stages and
not suddenly. The first step was taken when, on the institution of
a civil Administration, the nominated Advisory Council, which no^
exists, was established. It was stated at the time liy the High
Commissioner that this was the first step in the development of self-
governing institutions, and it is now proposed to take a second step

92

by the establishment of a Legislative Council containing a large
proportion of members elected on a wde franchise. It was proposed
in the jniblished draft that three of the members of this Council
should be non-oflScial persons nominated by the High Commissioner,
but representations having been made in opposioii to this provision,
based on cogent considerations, the Secretary of State is prepared to
omit it. Tfe Legislative Council would then consist of the High
f^ommissioner as Pi'esideiit and twelve elected and ten official
members The Secretary of State is of opinion that before a further
measure of self-government is extended to Palestine and the Assembly
placed in control over the Executive, it would be wise to allow some
time to elapse. During this period the institutions of the country
^YJll have become well established: its financial credit will be based
on firm foundations, and the Palestinian officials will have been
enabled to gain experience of sound methods of government After
a few years the situation will again be reviewed, and if the experience
of the working of the ronstitiitirai now to be established so warranted,
a larger share of autliority wouhl then be extended to the elected
re]n‘esetatives of people.

The Seci'etary of Rtate would point out that already the present
.\dministra1ion lias transferred to a yupreme Council elected by the
^Moslem community of Palestine the entire <?ontro] of Moslem
ladigious endowments (Wakfs), and of the Moslem religious courts
To this ConiuMl the Administration has also voluntarily restored
('onsiderable revenues derived i'loin ancient endowments ■which had
been sofinesl rated by the Turkish Oovernment. The Education
Department is also advised by a committee representative of all
sections of the popuhilion, and the Department of Commerce and
Industry lias the benefit of the co-optTation of the Chambers of
(‘onnuerce which have been establislied in the principal centres. It
is tlie intention of the Administration to associate in an increased
<legree similar representative (committees with the various Depart-
ments of the Government.

The Becretary of HI ate belie v(*s that a policy upon these lines,
coupled with the maintenance of the fullest religious liberty in
Palestine and with scrupulous regard for the rights of each
community with reference to its Holy Places, cannot but commend
itself to the various sections of the population, and that upon this
basis may be built up that spirit of cooperation upon which the
future j>rogress and prosperity of the Holy Land must largely depend.

THE JEWISH AND ARAB REPLIES.

The British White Paper in which this statement of Policy is
published also contains the replies of the Jews and Arabs to it.

The Jew'ish reply, in the form of a letter from Dr. Wei^mann
to the Colonial Office, transmitted the following resolution:

''The Execution of the Zionist' Organisation, having taken note
of -the statement relative to British policy in Palestine, transmitted

93

to^ them by the Colonial Office under date June 3rd, 1922, assure
His Majesty Government that t e activities of the Zionist Organisa-
tion will be conducted in conformity with the policy therein set
forth/’

The Arab reply, on the other hand, declined to concur in the
British Statement It pointed out that t e British document
contained some mis-statements of fact to which those with local
Ivnowledge could not subscribe, notably that the Zionist did not
“^possess any share in the general administration of the country/’ It
went on to claim t at the Arabs of P*alestiiie, who formed 93 per cent,
of the population, had as much right as had the Jews to be ^‘confirmed
111 their national home.” After reiterating that the McMahon promise
included independence for Palestine, the Arab reply concluded
by pointing out t at the Mandatory was wrong in thniking that its
policy was acceptable to all sections of the population. On the
contrary, it caused discontent among 93 per cent of the whole, who
feared the Zionists, who ‘‘enter Palestine by the might of England
against the will of the people who are convinced t at they have come
to strangle them Nature does not al’ow the creation of a spirit
of co-operation between two peoples so different . .The fact is that
His Majesty’s Government has placed itself m the position of a
partisan in Paleslin of a certain policy which the Arab cannot accept
because it means is extinction sooner or later ”